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This report is a survey of trade theories and reviews international trade implica-
tions of the new growth theories. Theories are reviewed by focusing on questions like 
why countries trade with each other, what can be gained by trade and how trade pat-
terns can be explained. These questions have been addressed by many economists since 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo and still there is much controversy in explaining the 
causes of trade. Differences between countries, for instance in natural factor endow-
ments and factor prices, can be a motive for trade between two countries. Countries 
trade in order to take advantage of these differences. This concept of trade is based 
on (the theory of) comparative advantage. However, other - more modern - theories 
state that countries may also trade because there are inherent advantages in specializa-
tion, arising from the existence of economies of scale. Some other models in modern 
trade theories emphasize imperfect competition, product differentiation and technol-
ogy gaps (innovation) across firms and countries as a major source of explanations for 
international trade. Finally, the trade implications of the 'new' growth theories will 
also be taken into account because these theories shed light upon the dynamic evolu-
tion of comparative advantage. This review results in a summary of the main character-
istics of the theories, their way of explaining international trade, implications of trade 
and the influence of government intervention. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
of the theories is discussed. 
Trade theories/Growth theories/Comparative advantage/Policy/Economies of scale/ 
Product differentiation/Technology gaps/Knowledge 
The contents of this report may be quoted or reproduced without further permission. 
Due acknowledgement is requested. 
CONTENTS 
Page 
FOREWORD 5 
SUMMARY 7 
1. INTRODUCTION 19 
2. TRADITIONAL TRADE THEORIES 29 
2.1 Classical theories 29 
2.1.1 Absolute advantage (Smith) 29 
2.1.2 Comparative advantage (Ricardo) 29 
2.2 Neo-classical theory 34 
2.2.1 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 34 
2.2.2 Specific factors model 37 
2.3 Trade policy under perfect competition 38 
2.4 Empirics 40 
3. MODERN TRADE THEORIES 43 
3.1 Economies of scale and imperfect competition 43 
3.1.1 External economies of scale 44 
3.1.2 Internal economies of scale and imperfect competition 45 
3.1.2.1 Monopolistic competition 45 
3.1.2.2 Oligopolistic competition 49 
3.1.3 Trade policy and imperfect competition 50 
3.1.4 Empirics of trade theories related to economies 
of scale and imperfect competition 54 
3.2 Neo-technology trade theories 56 
4. TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW GROWTH THEORIES 62 
4.1 New Growth Theories 62 
4.1.1 Knowledge as side product: external economies 
of scale 62 
4.1.2 Knowledge as investment: a combination of external 
and internal economies of scale wi th monopolistic 
competition 66 
4.1.3 Empirics 70 
4.2 Evolutionary Growth Theories 71 
Page 
5. CONCLUSIONS 75 
5.1 Evaluation of empirical tests of theories explaining 
international trade 75 
5.2 Government policy and international trade 76 
REFERENCES 79 
APPENDICES 89 
1. Traditional Trade Theories 90 
2. Modern Trade Theories 92 
3. Trade implications of the growth theories 95 
FOREWORD 
Most agricultural trade analysis focuses on basic agricultural commodities 
and rests on traditional theoretical insights of comparative advantage, assum-
ing perfect competitive markets on which goods are homogeneous and pro-
duced under a technology of constant returns to scale. However, the observa-
t ion of changing trade characteristics in agriculture and food products, private 
business concentration and active government policy suggest that international 
agricultural trade analysis implies investigating market structures other than 
the competitive mode. In order to strengthen and buildup the theoretical and 
empirical knowledge base in the field of international trade in agricultural and 
food products, the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO) 
launched the research project 'Policy and Patterns of International Trade' which 
is financed by the Institute's budget for Strategic Expertise Development (SEO 
programme). 
The objectives of this research project are to: 
analyse international trade theories, with the aim to answer the question: 
what determines international trade patterns and which role does gov-
ernment policy play in this? 
assess the usability of general trade theories in explaining agricultural 
trade; 
design a concept for explaining world trade patterns in agricultural com-
modities. 
This publication reports on the first objective of the project. Its main aim 
is to present an overview of the main theories that deal wi th international 
trade, as there are the neo-classical, 'traditional' trade theories and the 'mod-
ern' trade theories. The trade implications of the 'new' growth theories are 
also taken into account. This review of theories - written mainly during the 
course of 1996 - acts as an input in the following stages of the project. The 
second stage, on the assessment of the general trade theories on their applica-
bility for explaining agricultural trade, has been reported in Onderzoekver-
slag 162. 
The director. 
The Hague, April 1998 L.C. Zachariasse 
SUMMARY 
The question why countries trade with each other has been answered in 
many different ways. Differences between countries, for instance in natural 
factor endowments and technology, can be a motive for trade between coun-
tries. Countries trade in order to take advantage of these differences. This con-
cept of trade is based on (the theory of) comparative advantage. However, 
other recent theories state that countries may also trade because there are in-
herent advantages in specialization, arising from the existence of economies 
of scale. Some other models in modern trade theories emphasize imperfect 
competition, product differentiation and technology gaps (innovation) across 
firms and countries as a major source of international trade. Finally, the 'new' 
growth theories emphasize the endogenous generation of technological 
change which has important implications for international trade. 
The main aim of this study is to present an overview of the main theories 
that deal with international trade. The general structure of this overview is 
illustrated in figure 1. In a historical sense we can identify three major streams 
(depicted as the three columns in figure 1). First, we can identify the classical 
and neo-classical trade theories which we call the Traditional Trade Theories'. 
The most prominent model of this stream became the neoclassical Heckscher-
Ohlin model that dominated the field for almost eighty years. Despite their 
theoretical dominance, some implications were not supported by empirical 
evidence. This induced economists to search for new trade theories. These new 
theories, which were mainly developed in the late seventies and early eighties, 
are collected in our second major stream, the 'Modern Trade Theories'. In the 
late eighties, ideas that were generated by these modern trade theories in-
duced changes in the growth literature and led to the so-called 'new' growth 
theories, which also shed light upon the dynamic evolution of comparative 
advantage. The trade implications of these growth theories are also taken into 
account and captured in our third main stream, 'Trade Implications of Growth 
Theories'. 
Within each major stream a further classification in schools of thought is 
made based on crucial assumptions and the main mechanism of trade. Each 
school of thought is presented with a grey ellipse in figure 1; the arrows be-
tween two ellipses or schools indicate a strong relation between these two 
schools. A relation in the sense that it builds forward on (elements of) a former 
one but changes or brings in a crucial (new) assumption. 
An important discriminating aspect is whether or not technology differs 
between countries (the horizontal line in the middle of figure 1 represents this 
distinction). When a school of thought assumes that technology differs across 
countries it is depicted in the upper part of figure 1, and when a school as-
sumes that technology is identical across countries it is depicted in the lower 

part. Because in the new growth theories within one school technology can 
vary across countries, we identified two directions within these schools. Each 
direction is illustrated as a white box in figure 1. 
Before we discuss the schools of thought in more detail we discuss the 
main relation (arrows) between the schools. As many other theories, the trade 
theories find some of their roots in The Wealth of Nations' of Adam Smith. 
Smith showed that trade is possible when one country can produce a certain 
good with less labour than the other country and the other country can pro-
duce another good more efficiently. Ricardo showed that trade is even possible 
when one country can produce all goods more efficiently than the other coun-
try if the relative costs of production of two goods differ between countries. 
This is known as the principle of comparative advantage which is still one of 
the most important concepts in trade theory. The Neo-classical Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model elaborated the theory of Ricardo by introduc-
ing another factor of production (capital), but assuming identical production 
techniques across countries. An implication of this change in assumptions is 
that factor endowments became the main explanation for trade. The specific-
factor model assumes that one factor is specific to the production of one good; 
because the income implications are different from the standard H-O-S this 
theory is treated separately. 
Because some of the trade implications of the H-O-S model were not sup-
ported by empirical evidence, the modern trade theories replaced the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale or identical production technologies. Econo-
mies of scale can be external or internal to a firm. With external economies of 
scale perfect competition remains why internal economies of scale imply imper-
fect competition. This distinction is important because trade implications differ 
between the two approaches. The third school within the modern trade theo-
ries, i.e. the neo-technology trade theories, like the classical theories, stressed 
the central role of technology. However, in contrast to these theories techno-
logical differences are not static between countries but are temporarily created 
by innovations. The evolutionary growth theories build forward on this theory 
and focussed more in depth on the innovation process; innovations are cumula-
tive, specific and irreversible. 
Like the neo-technology trade theories, the more formalized 'new' 
growth theories also stressed the role of knowledge creation. The various ways 
in which knowledge creation can be modelled are taken from the modern 
trade theories that stressed economies of scale. When knowledge is a by-prod-
uct of other activities or caused by learning-by-doing effects, there is a close 
resemblance with external economies of scale. However, when knowledge is 
the intentional outcome of economic behaviour firms have to invest some re-
sources in knowledge creation. This means that firms have some fixed costs that 
lead to internal economies of scale and imperfect competition. This approach 
uses also elements of the neo-technology trade theories because an innovation 
leads to (temporary) new products. Furthermore, it uses some elements from 
the external economies of scale approach because a part of the knowledge 
created by the firm can be used by other firms. Important with regard to trade 
and growth implications is whether these so-called knowledge spillovers are 
national or international in nature. In both schools of the new growth theories 
the initial trade pattern is caused by differences in factor endowments or dif-
ferences in initial knowledge levels. 
Traditional theories 
Within the traditional trade theories, classical theory (Smith and Ricardo) 
and neo-classical theory (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) are the schools of 
thought to be distinguished. Traditional trade theories focus on differences 
among countries that are the result of differences in technology (classical the-
ory) or differences in relative factor endowments (neo-classical theory). One of 
the first theories of international trade is the classical theory of absolute cost 
advantages. According to Smith, trade only appears when there are absolute 
cost differences between countries. David Ricardo showed the shortcomings of 
this theory because, even if one country can produce all goods more efficiently 
than another country, trade is possible and beneficial. A pre-condition is that 
the relative efficiency gap is not the same for all goods. When this is the case, 
a country has a comparative advantage in a good that has the highest effi-
ciency gap. In the Ricardian model labour is the only production factor and 
differences in labour productivity are the main explanation for trade. Labour 
productivity differs between countries because their technological knowledge 
level differs and/or there are differences in natural circumstances (natural re-
sources, climate, soil, geographical position). 
The neo-classical theory elaborated these theories by including more pro-
duction factors. However, contrary to the classical theories this theory assumed 
identical production techniques over countries. Furthermore, the standard neo-
classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model assumes constant returns to 
scale, identical consumer preferences and perfect competition. These assump-
tions imply that differences in factor endowments are the only explanation of 
trade in the H-O-S model. The larger the difference in factor endowments, the 
more trade between countries and all this trade is inter-industry trade. A coun-
try exports the good which makes the most intensive use of it's abundant fac-
tor of production. The relative abundant factor will gain from trade. In the 
trade equilibrium relative factor prices are the same across countries. 
In the traditional theories gains from trade come from exchange and 
specialization. All countries will benefit from trade because of a more rational 
allocation of productive resources and lower relative prices for the importing 
competing product. The less barriers to trade there are, the more beneficial 
trade will be. Therefore, free trade policy is seen as the best trade policy, unless 
countries can improve their terms of trade (only large countries). Trade policy 
to 'correct' domestic distortions or for political reasons (for instance income-
distributional effects of trade) are second best. 
The specific-factor model is a special version of the standard neo-classical 
H-O-S model. In the standard H-O-S model all production factors are mobile 
between sectors, while in the short-term specific-factor model some are immo-
bile. This implies, for example that trade implications for production factor 
rewards are totally different from the standard model. Trade is beneficial for 
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the specific factor that is necessary to produce the export good and it reduces 
the income of the specific factor used in the import good. The welfare implica-
tions of trade for the mobile factor depend on the consumption pattern of a 
worker and are ambiguous. 
Despite the theoretical dominance of the neo-classical model for a long 
period the implications of this model were not unambiguously supported by 
empirical studies. The most influential study was done by Leontief (1953) who 
found that imports of the US (a capital abundant country) were more capital 
intensive than its exports. However, the application of Leontief's method has 
been criticized by many authors and the suggestion that the H-O-S theory per-
forms badly has been counteracted. As a byproduct of Leontief's results and the 
debate that followed, the H-O-S theorem has been extended to allow for addi-
tional factors beyond just capital and labour to explain trade, or make a clearer 
distinction between skilled and unskilled labour and human and physical capi-
tal as factors determining international trade flows. 
Modem trade theories 
Still, empirical studies showed that - contrary to what would be expected 
according to the H-O-S theory - most trade is between countries with the same 
factor endowments that a major part of trade between industrial countries is 
of an intra-industry nature and that income-distributional effects of trade are 
small. These contradiction with traditional theory induced economists to search 
for new trade theories. The 'new' trade theories elaborated the neo-classical 
framework by replacing the assumptions of constant returns to scale and per-
fect competition. A second stream, the 'neo-technology theories', like the clas-
sical theories, stressed the central role of technology and proposed a radical 
departure from the neo-classical framework. 
The 'new' trade theories assumed increasing returns to scale and this im-
plies imperfect competition unless economies of scale are assumed to be totaiy 
external to the individual firms. A first approach assumes these so-called 'exter-
nal economies of scale'; an industry still contains many small firms and perfect 
competition remains. A second approach assumes internal economies of scale 
which lead to imperfect competition. Within this approach two directions have 
been identified. The first direction concentrates on modelling economies of 
scale and treats market imperfections as simply as possible by assuming monop-
olistic competition. A second direction concentrates on imperfect competition 
and uses economies of scale to cause these market imperfections. The main 
market structure they use is 'Cournot' or 'Bertrand' oligopoly. The main differ-
ence between these 'new' trade theories and the neo-technology trade theo-
ries is that the former assume identical production technologies across coun-
tries while the latter emphasize (endogenous) technological innovation and 
technology gaps across firms and countries as a major reason for international 
trade. 
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Economies of scale and (im)perfect competition 
According to the new trade theories, trade is possible between countries 
identical in factor endowments, technologies and tastes. In these theories the 
main explanation for trade are economies of scale. However, in contradiction 
to the traditional theories, the direction of specialization with economies of 
scale is often unknown. Consequently, this theory gives an important role to 
history and accident in determining the pattern of international trade. 
Economies of scale can be external or internal. Implications of trade differ 
when economies of scale are external or internal. When external economies are 
important, a country starting with a large industry may retain that advantage 
even if another country could potentially produce the same goods more cheap-
ly. Gains from trade come from exchange, specialization and exploiting econo-
mies of scale. However, the division of welfare between countries can be very 
unequal, depending on the specialization pattern (whether the country special-
izes in the good produced with external economies of scale or not) and terms 
of trade (depending on supply and demand of goods in the trade equilibrium). 
Countries can even loose from trade. In that case trade (or industrial) policies 
can be beneficial. 
With monopolistic competition, an industry contains a sufficiently large 
number of 'similar' firms producing differentiated 'unique' products and profits 
are competed away in the equilibrium. The main mechanism of trade at a mar-
ket structure of monopolistic competition are (internal) economies of scale and 
product differentiation which cause the production of each variety to be con-
centrated in each country. Each country produces a different set of varieties of 
a certain product. Because consumers display a 'love of variety', they demand 
all varieties, which implies that a country imports each of the varieties pro-
duced in other countries and exports each of the varieties domestically pro-
duced. So, there will be intra-industry trade. However, it is unclear which coun-
try produces which variety. Again the exact specialization pattern depends on 
history and accident. 
The gains from trade with monopolistic competition are from exchange, 
specialization, exploiting economies of scale, exit of redundant firms and more 
product variety. Income-distributional effects of intra-industry trade are less 
than those of inter-industry trade (H-O-S model) because there are additional 
gains from trade. Because intra-industry trade will be dominant between coun-
tries at a similar level of economic development, trade without serious income-
distributional effects is most likely to happen in trade between countries similar 
in their relative factor endowments. 
In an oligopolistic market structure, the behaviour of the firms influences 
each other. Trade occurs because of economies of scale. However, if market 
segmentation and price discrimination are possible, there can be trade even 
without economies of scale and comparative advantage. Gains from trade ap-
pear in the form of the pro-competitive effect (i.e. lower mark-up), the exit of 
firms which are unable to cover their fixed costs, and lower average costs if the 
production scale of a firm increases. Welfare implications are unclear. 
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The assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect markets justified 
the domination of free trade policy for almost a century. These 'new' trade 
theories question this free trade policy by introducing economies of scale and 
imperfect markets. They find that an active trade policy can be beneficial in 
certain circumstances. For instance, if in an industry makes excessive profits, 
such an industry should be desired. Under certain conditions, the use of export 
subsidies can also shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. This is the so-
called 'strategic' trade policy. However, the new arguments for protection are 
very dependent on specific assumptions. A slight change in one of the assump-
tions changes or even reverses the implications of a policy. Good policy there-
fore requires that the government has a lot of information to help choose the 
right model. This information has to be so detailed that it is not readily avail-
able. The empirics also show that benefits from deviations from free trade are 
small. Furthermore, empirical tests of theories related to economies of scale 
and imperfect competition appear to be rather suggestive. Estimates of the 
impact of trade policies under imperfect competition lend no support to a stra-
tegic role for trade policy. Therefore, free trade is still considered to be a good 
rule of thumb, although it is not optimal under imperfect competition. 
Neo-technology theories 
The common feature of technology-oriented theories of trade is an em-
phasis on technological change and the resulting patterns of trade. In these 
theories trade patterns are explained in terms of technological progress. Tech-
nological differences or gaps across countries are an endogenous outcome 
through firm level product and process innovation that reduces costs of produc-
tion and generates new products. The flow of technological developments and 
innovation is assumed to be not free and instantaneous, which implies that a 
firm/country has at least a temporary comparative advantage in production 
and exports. The difference with the Ricardian trade models is that in those 
models differences in technology (productivity) for some given goods cause 
trade, where in the neo-technology trade models trade is induced because the 
innovating country generates some new products that other countries, at least 
temporarily, are unable to produce. 
Early contributions in this field have been made by Kravis, Posner, Vernon 
and Hirsch in the 1950s and 1960s. These authors describe a continual process 
of innovative developments in which countries where the innovations occur 
enjoy temporarily technological advantage over trading partners until the new 
technology is imitated in other countries. Each of the contributors stresses dif-
ferent reasons in explaining why countries will produce and export new pro-
ducts, like the availability of technology to produce new products (as in Pos-
ner's 'technology gap' model), the availability of skilled labour (Hirsch) or vicin-
ity of their markets (as in Vernon's 'product cycle hypothesis'). 
Krugman has formalized the attempts to try to explain trade in terms of 
technology in his North-South model. In this model the North innovates a con-
tinuous stream of new product varieties on the market, while the South only 
imitates after a time-lag. The main mechanism for trade are technology gaps 
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which grow with innovation and close with imitation. Both countries benefit 
from trade because of exchange, specialization and more product variety. How-
ever, while the world is better off as production is shifting to a lower-cost 
country, the North may lose from imitation by the South. The innovating coun-
try may try to increase the innovation rate (innovation policy) or consider 
protectionistic measures to reduce imitation, unless there is a correct interna-
tionally technology transfer system. 
Most, if not all empirical tests of the technology trade theories try to ex-
plain the pattern of trade of the US, simply assuming that the US is the innova-
tive Northern country with high per capita incomes and relative wages and the 
rest of the world the imitating South. These tests are usually rather successful. 
Several authors sought and found positive correlations between US export per-
formance across industries and various measures of R&D. Since R&D is related 
to technological progress, whatever its cause or effects, this evidence lends 
support to all technology theories of trade. Several tests of the technology 
theory of trade have also introduced additional explanatory variables, includ-
ing those that are appropriate to the factor proportions theory, and support 
the conclusion that there is a strong and positive correlation between trade 
performance and technology-related variables. At the same time, however, it 
becomes clear that technology-related variables are much related to the ability 
of individuals, firms, or countries to develop and exploit technology which is 
related to the availability of knowledge and skills. It is, therefore, difficult to 
distinguish evidence supporting technology from evidence supporting human 
capital or skills as determinants of trade. Furthermore, more recent observa-
tions suggest that technological levels among countries converge rapidly and 
because of multinationals the speed of diffusion of innovations accelerate. So 
it appears that, besides the older tests with US data, empirical tests or applica-
tion of the product cycle theory are limited in extent. The support from these 
studies for the idea of the 'technology gap' as driving force behind trade is 
fragmentary at best, suggesting evidence for the idea that transitory advan-
tage resulting from innovation can be a major factor in trade for only some 
industries. 
Trade Implications of Growth Theories 
While all trade theories are mainly static and focus on allocation issues, 
an interesting development has taken place in the growth literature. The 'new' 
growth theories build forward on the static 'new' trade models and put them 
in a dynamic context. The new trade theories provided the building blocks such 
as the treatment of economies of scale and market imperfections. Like the neo-
technology theories the 'new' growth theories stress the role of technological 
change. By putting these elements in a dynamic context these 'new' growth 
theories deal with the dynamic evolution of comparative advantage and the 
consequences of trade in a world of global technological competition. 
The new growth theories found several ways to endogenize technological 
change in a general equilibrium model. Two approaches can be distinguished. 
The first approach assumes that externalities or 'learning-by-doing' effects, 
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which are by-products of other activities, cause growth and the external econo-
mies of scale approach is used to model these effects. The second approach 
assumes that technological change is the intentional outcome of economic 
behaviour and firms have to 'invest' in knowledge creation to obtain techno-
logical change. Investments in knowledge can be seen as a kind of fixed costs 
and monopolistic competition makes it possible to cover these fixed costs. Most 
studies that use the second approach, also assume that knowledge generates 
some externalities and are therefore a mixture of both approaches. 
In models where external economies of scale determine the dynamical 
evolution of the specialization pattern (the first approach), the central mecha-
nism is that a firm - unintentionally - creates knowledge and this knowledge 
flows directly to all other firms, where it increases the productivity level of the 
production factor that can be accumulated. In principle the initial specialization 
and trade pattern is determined by comparative advantage (initial factor en-
dowments) or the initial knowledge stock (technological capabilities). The dy-
namic implications of these external economies of scale growth theories are 
that a country will built up knowledge or expertise in the goods in which it 
specializes and therefore reinforces its comparative advantage in these goods. 
Because the technological opportunities differ between goods the specializa-
tion pattern determines therefore also the welfare level and long term growth 
of a country. 
Depending on the specific demand conditions, trade or industrial policy 
may be beneficial if a country specializes in the low-tech good; this may reduce 
welfare or may lead to less welfare than in the case the country had specialized 
in the high-tech good. Protection measures or industrial policies may reverse 
the specialization pattern when specialization in an other sector increases wel-
fare. However, to deduce the correct policy advice is very difficult because one 
has to know the exact technological opportunities of different goods in differ-
ent countries. 
Models that concentrate on the investment in knowledge (human capital) 
combine imperfect competition with externalities. Through investments in 
R&D, a firm produces new goods by expanding product variety or quality. Fur-
thermore, there are also some spillovers on the aggregate stock of knowledge. 
A larger stock of knowledge, in turn, reduces the costs of producing blueprints 
of new products. This causes a constant incentive to invest in R&D. Manufactur-
ing will therefore also be growing at a constant ratio. Important for the gener-
ation of endogenous growth is that the incentive to invest in R&D does not 
decline. In all these kind of models the growing stock of knowledge as a side 
product of R&D generates this constant incentive. The R&D investments are 
dependent on the specialization pattern which is caused by the principle of 
comparative advantage (factor endowments), history, the initial stock of know-
ledge, the scale of a country and the demand structure. These factors deter-
mine the number of people that are working in the R&D sector, the high-tech 
and the low-tech sector. The welfare and growth implications are therefore 
also dependent on the specialization pattern. Important is whether knowledge 
spillovers are national or international in scope. 
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When there are international knowledge spillovers, all innovators will 
have the same knowledge and national advantages in R&D arise only from 
differences in relative factor prices (which are dependent on resource endow-
ments). Factors such as the size of a country and the history of its production 
play no role in the long-term trade pattern; what only matters are factor en-
dowments. 
With only national knowledge spillovers the initial conditions govern long 
run outcomes. In many situations the country with the initial greater stock of 
knowledge has an advantage in R&D and accumulates knowledge more quickly 
than its trading partner. This sustains and adds to its productivity lead. History 
alone determines long-run trade patterns and growth rates (i.e. hysteresis). 
Arguments for policy are to obtain a higher welfare level by reversing the 
specialization pattern if there are only national knowledge spillovers. Industrial 
policy (R&D subsidies) are considered first best and trade policy measures as 
second best policy. 
Evolutionary growth theories assume that technology plays the funda-
mental role in economic life. Technological change and innovation is a cumula-
tive, specific and irreversible process. The main trade mechanism is that abso-
lute technological differences determine the world market position of all sec-
tors. Relative technological gaps play a minor part. They determine the special-
ization pattern between sectors according to the mechanism of comparative 
advantage. Future growth and technological developments is determined by 
the current specialization pattern. The current specialization pattern of a coun-
try has therefore a dynamic effect because this pattern determines in which 
sectors technical skills will be accumulated, innovations will be done, economies 
of scale will be realised, etcetera. Sectors differ in their growth opportunities 
such that the present specialization pattern is extremely important for the 
countries' future economic performance. A specialization pattern according to 
the traditional mechanism of comparative advantage can lead a country to 
specialize in those industries (sectors) and activities in which the opportunities 
for growth and technological development are least. A specialization pattern 
which is static (Ricardian) efficient can therefore be dynamic inefficient and 
vice versa. If this tradeoff occurs, a country can try to change the specialization 
pattern and future growth path through industrial or trade policy. 
Evaluation on policy 
Traditional theories suggest that trade is beneficial for all countries in-
volved and therefore support free trade. Only in some circumstances (a large 
country may improve its terms of trade) there is an argument for trade policy. 
Modern trade theories extend the traditional arguments for trade policy and 
add some new arguments for government policy intervention such as the stra-
tegic trade argument. However, the circumstances in which a trade policy may 
be beneficial appear to be very specific. Moreover, a government needs a lot 
of very detailed information to make the right decision. And besides that, 
empirics show that benefits from deviations from free trade are very small. So, 
modern trade theories still support free trade, although it is recognized that 
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free trade is not optimal under imperfect competition. The 'new' growth theo-
ries most of the time assume free knowledge spillovers across countries. Then, 
trade policies will not be beneficial. However, the evolutionary growth theory 
assumes that a crucial part of the generated knowledge is cumulative, specific 
and path dependent and spillovers are therefore local or national in scope. In 
that case trade policy may become beneficial because the gains at stake can be 
very large in some circumstances. Government policy still requires a lot of infor-
mation about many difficult to measure economic variables such as technologi-
cal opportunities, knowledge spillovers, and external economies of scale. Still, 
government policy seems to be more worthwhile than in the case of the mod-
ern trade theories because the gains at stake are larger. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The survey of trade theories is part of the research project 'Policy and 
Patterns of International Trade', executed by the Agricultural Economics Re-
search Institute (LEI-DLO), financed by the Institute's budget on Strategic Exper-
tise Development (SEO programme). The objectives of this research project are 
to: 
1. analyse international trade theories, with the aim to answer the question: 
what determines international trade patterns and which role does gov-
ernment policy play in this? 
2. assess the usability of general trade theories in explaining agricultural 
trade; 
3. design a concept for explaining world trade patterns in agricultural com-
modities. 
The first activity in this research project, a review of literature, should 
throw light upon the factors that are crucial in explaining trade. A second activ-
ity is to assess the usability of these theories for research on agricultural sectors. 
We first describe the features of agricultural chains and markets (focusing on 
all factors that could be of importance) and thereafter confront the trade theo-
ries wi th these features and empirical data on the agricultural sector. This con-
frontation will result in depicting the factors of importance (and circumstances 
under which they are of importance) in explaining agricultural trade. Then 
these factors should become the building stones for a design of a concept ex-
plaining world trade patterns in agricultural commodities. Of course, questions 
of data-availability to operationalize the concept are addressed. 
This report analyses international trade theories (objective 1 of the pro-
ject). An introduction to the trade theories is made by classifying them accord-
ing to certain key elements. In the following chapters, international trade theo-
ries are described more exhaustively, focusing on the explanation of interna-
tional trade and the role of governments to play. 
Why do countries trade with each other? What can be gained by trade 
and how can trade patterns be explained? These questions have been ad-
dressed by many economists ever since Smith at the end of the eighteenth and 
Ricardo in the early nineteenth century. Many different answers have been 
given to the question what causes trade and still there is much controversy on 
this issue. Differences between countries, for instance in natural factor endow-
ments and factor prices, can be a motive for trade between two countries. 
Countries trade in order to take advantage of these differences. This concept 
of trade is based on (the theory of) comparative advantage. However, other -
more modern - theories state that countries may also trade because there are 
inherent advantages in specialization, arising from the existence of economies 
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of scale. Some other models in modern trade theories emphasize imperfect 
competition, product differentiation and technology gaps (innovation) across 
firms and countries as a major source of explanations for international trade. 
Finally, the trade implications of the 'new' growth theories will also be taken 
into account because these theories shed light upon the dynamic evolution of 
comparative advantage. 
A General Classification of Theories of International Trade 
In the economic literature, international trade theories can be classified 
in two major streams: the traditional and modern trade theories. Within both 
schools, a further differentiation can be made, based on the major elements 
the theory is focused on. In the following, an outline of the theoretical princi-
ples of each mainstream will be given, plus the thoughts of the most important 
authors of each stream. International trade theories may be classified in the 
fol lowing way: 
1. Traditional trade theories 
- Mercantilism 
- Classical theory 
- Absolute advantage (Smith) 
- Comparative advantage (Ricardo) 
- Neo-classical theory (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) 
- specific factors model (short term) 
2. Modern trade theories 
- Economies of scale and imperfect competition 
- External economies of scale 
- Internal economies of scale and imperfect competition 
- Monopolistic competition 
- Oligopolistic competition 
- Neo-technology trade theories 
- Technology gap theory 
3. Trade Implications of the Growth Theories 
- New Growth Theories 
- Knowledge as side product: External economies of scale 
- Knowledge as investment: A combination of external and internal 
economies of scale with monopolistic competition 
- Evolutionary Growth Theories 
The term 'mercantilism' stands for the theory and system of political econ-
omy prevailing in Europe after the decline of feudalism (approximately 1,500 
to 1,750). This system was based on national policies of accumulating gold bul-
lion, establishing colonies and a merchant marine, and developing industry and 
mining to attain a favourable balance of trade. Mercantilism emphasized poli-
cies that encouraged exports of domestic products and discouraged imports. 
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Neo-mercantilism is a modern concept defined as a tendency of a country to 
accumulate large amounts of hard foreign exchange. 
Traditional trade theories focus on differences among countries that are 
the result of differences in technology (classical theory) or differences in rela-
tive factor endowments (neo-classical theory). One of the first theories of inter-
national trade is the classical theory of absolute cost advantages. According to 
Smith, the main representative of this school, trade only appears when there 
are absolute cost differences between countries. David Ricardo showed the 
shortcomings of this theory because, even if one country can produce all goods 
more efficiently than another country, trade is possible and beneficial. A pre-
condition is that the relative efficiency gap is not the same for all goods. When 
this is the case, a country has a comparative advantage in a good that has the 
highest efficiency gap. 
The neo-classical theory, which dominated international trade theory for 
a long time, elaborated these theories by including more production factors. 
However, contrary to the classical theories this theory assumed identical pro-
duction techniques over countries. Furthermore, the standard neo-classical 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model assumes constant returns to scale, 
identical consumer preferences and perfect competition. These assumptions 
imply that differences in factor endowments are the only explanation of trade 
in the H-O-S model. The larger the difference in factor endowments, the more 
trade between countries and all this trade is inter-industry trade. 
The specific-factor model is a special version of the standard neo-classical 
H-O-S model. In the standard model all production factors are mobile between 
sectors, while in the specific-factor model one factor is mobile and one factor 
is immobile. We include this so-called short term version of the H-O-S model in 
this review because the trade implication for production factor rewards are 
totally different from the standard model. 
Despite the theoretical dominance of the neo-classical model for a long 
period the implications of this model were not supported by empirical studies. 
The most influential study was done by Leontief (1953) who found that the US 
(a capital abundant country) imports were more capital intensive than US ex-
ports. Furthermore, empirical studies showed that most trade is between coun-
tries with the same factor endowments and that a great part of trade between 
industrial countries is intra-industry trade (Balassa 1967, Grubel and Lloyd 
1975). 
These contradictions with traditional theory induced economists to search 
for new trade theories. The 'new' trade theories elaborated the neo-classical 
framework by replacing the most unrealistic assumptions of constant returns 
to scale and perfect competition. A second stream, the so-called 'neo-technol-
ogy theories', like the classical theories, stressed the central role of technology 
and proposed a more radical departure from the neo-classical framework. 
The 'new' trade theories assumed increasing returns to scale and this im-
plies imperfect competition of scale unless economies of scale are assumed 
total external to the individual firms. A first approach assumes these so-called 
'external economies of scale'; an industry still contains many small firms and 
perfect competition remains. A second approach assumes internal economies 
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of scale which lead to imperfect competition. Within this approach two direc-
tions can be identified. The first direction concentrates on modelling econo-
mies of scale and treat market imperfections as simple as possible by assuming 
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Norman 1980, Helpman and Krugman 
1985). A second direction concentrates on imperfect competition and uses eco-
nomies of scale to cause these market imperfections. The main market structure 
they use is 'Cournot' or 'Bertrand' oligopoly (Brander and Spencer 1985, Help-
man and Krugman 1989). The main difference between these 'new' trade theo-
ries and the neo-technology trade theories is that the former assume identical 
production technologies across countries while the latter emphasize (endoge-
nous) technological innovation and technology gaps across firms and countries 
as a major reason for international trade. 
While all these trade theories are mainly static and focus on allocation 
issues, an interesting development has taken place in the growth literature. 
The 'new' growth theories build forward on the static 'new' trade models and 
put them in a dynamic context. The new trade theories provided the building 
blocks such as the treatment of economies of scale and market imperfections. 
Like the neo-technology theories the 'new' growth theories stress the role of 
technological change. By putting these elements in a dynamic context these 
'new' growth theories deal therefore with the dynamic evolution of compara-
tive advantage and the consequences of trade in a world of global technologi-
cal competition (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991b). This makes it 
very interesting to include the trade implications of the growth theories in our 
review of international trade theories. 
Classification Criteria 
We use the following criteria to survey the trade theories. 
1. Assumptions: what are the main assumptions of a theory? 
2. Central mechanism: what is the central mechanism in a theory to explain 
trade? 
3. Implications: what are the main implications of a theory (e.g. gains from 
trade)? 
4. Policy: what are the main effects of government policy in a theory? 
5. Empirics: which kind of empirical tests are done to test the theory and do 
these tests support the theory? 
Each criterion to survey trade theories consists of many elements or as-
pects. Next, the main key elements of each criteria to be distinguished are 
shown. Most of the key elements are subdivided in a number of aspects which 
need to be considered in reviewing trade theories. 
22 
Ad 1. Assumptions: 
Supply: 
Production factors 
- number 
- which? (land, labour, capital, human capital, knowledge) 
- mobile across sectors 
- immobile across sectors 
- mobile across countries 
- immobile across countries 
- initial endowments differ between countries 
- which factor can be accumulated (in case of growth theories)? 
Sectors/goods 
- number 
- homogeneous 
- differentiated 
Technology: 
Economies of scale 
- constant economies of scale 
- increasing economies of scale 
- external economies of scale 
- internal economies of scale 
Production technology 
- identical between goods 
- different between goods 
- identical between countries 
- different between countries 
- no technological change 
- technological change 
- exogenous 
- endogenous 
- process innovations 
- product innovations 
- new varieties (horizontal product differentiation) 
- consumer products 
- producer products 
- quality improvements (vertical product differentiation) 
Knowledge spillovers 
- knowledge spillovers do not exist 
- knowledge spillovers do exist 
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national knowledge spillovers 
international knowledge spillovers 
knowledge spillovers across different kinds of goods 
good specific knowledge spillovers 
Demand: 
Consumer preferences 
- identical across income levels (i.e. homothetic) 
- different between income levels 
- identical between countries 
- different between countries 
Markets: 
Good market 
- perfect competition 
- imperfect competition 
- monopoly 
- oligopoly 
- monopolistic competition 
Factor market 
- perfect competition (markets clear) 
- markets do not necessarily clear 
Ad 2. Main mechanism 
differences in technology (technology gaps) 
differences in factor endowments 
differences in consumer preferences 
economies of scale 
imperfect competition 
market segmentation and price discrimination 
Extra for growth theories 
Main growth mechanism 
Ad 3. Implications 
Which country exports which goods? 
- inter-industry trade 
- intra-industry trade 
Gains from trade 
- specialization 
- gains from exchange 
- exploiting economies of scale 
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- more product variety 
- pro-competitiveness effect 
- higher rate of innovation 
Do factor prices converge between countries? 
Which production factors gain, which loose? 
Extra for growth theories 
Which factor can increase growth rate? 
Welfare implications: Is the growth rate optimal in the equilibrium? 
- yes 
- no 
- which policy is needed to obtain the optimal equilibrium? 
Ad 4. Policy 
Arguments for government policy 
- terms of trade 
- infant industry argument 
- externalities 
- strategic trade argument 
- political arguments 
Which government policies can be implemented? 
- trade policy (tariffs, quota) 
- industrial policy (subsidies, taxes) 
- innovation policies (subsidies) 
- competition policy 
Main effects of these policies on 
- total welfare 
- government budget, consumer, and producer surplus 
- different sectors 
- different factors of production 
- neighbour countries 
Ad 5. Empirics 
Is it possible to test the theory? 
- no 
- yes 
- empirical studies support theory 
- empirical studies contradict theory 
Critical remarks 
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Elaboration 
In the next chapters, each school of thought is described by focusing on 
the five specific issues mentioned above: assumptions, mechanisms, implica-
tions, government policy and empirical evidence of the theory. This review 
should result in a summary of the main characteristics of the theories, their way 
of explaining international trade, implications of trade and the influence of 
government intervention. Furthermore, the empirical evidence of the theories 
are discussed. These issues are summarized in a matrix. 
The review of theories are to be used as an input in the fol lowing stages 
of the project. In the second stage, the general trade theories are assessed on 
their usability in explaining agricultural trade. Here we take a broad definition 
of agricultural products: these are not only agricultural products produced by 
primary sectors, but all products produced in the agricultural chain, including, 
for example, products produced by the food processing industries. In order to 
do this evaluation, first the features, such as for example production technol-
ogy and market structure, of the food and agricultural chains and markets have 
to be described. Thereafter, these agricultural characteristics will be confronted 
with features of the trade theories reviewed, and this results in an overview of 
the major factors of importance in explaining agricultural trade. 
We can illustrate this idea with the matrix 'Confronting characteristics of 
product X with assumptions of the trade theories' presented below. The col-
umns represent the theories that are studied in phase one and the rows depict 
the characteristics of an (group of) agricultural product. When one characteris-
tic of the agricultural product is embodied in a certain theory we put a cross in 
the matrix. In this way we can identify which theory or theories explain a part 
of the trade for a certain agricultural product. 
Confronting characteristics of product X with assumptions of the trade theories 
Theory 1 Theory 2 Theory n 
Characteristic 1 X X 
Characteristic 2 X 
X X X X 
Characteristic n X X 
The main objective of this study is to design a concept to explain agricul-
tural trade patterns. Most trade theories focus on one mechanism for trade 
that is dependent on one or two assumptions. All the other assumptions are 
treated as simple as possible and assumed to be identical across countries. How-
ever, in the real world countries differ in many aspects and many mechanisms 
for trade work at the same time (some mechanisms reinforce each other, other 
neutralise each other). In this study we try to design a framework or concept 
for certain groups of agricultural products with more or less homogenous char-
acteristics (for each homogenous group a different framework). Such a frame-
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work starts with the characteristics of the homogenous product group, such as 
homogenous or differentiated product, and incorporates all the trade mecha-
nisms that are linked to these characteristics. This will be no framework wi th 
formulas and equations but a framework, containing the major factors of im-
portance and circumstances under which these factors are of importance in 
explaining agricultural trade. Such a framework will be a qualitative model, in 
which the importance of the factors distinguished are discussed in relation to 
specific circumstances cq. features of agricultural product and markets. 
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2. TRADITIONAL TRADE THEORIES 
2.1 Classical theories 
The classical theories explain trade by differences in production technolo-
gies between countries. First, we briefly discuss the absolute advantage theory 
of Adam Smith and second we describe the comparative advantage theory 
developed by David Ricardo in a more elaborated way. 
2.1.1 Absolute advantage (Smith) 
One of the first theories of international trade is the classical theory of 
absolute cost differences or absolute advantages. According to this theory 
trade appears only when there are absolute cost differences between coun-
tries. We illustrate this principle with a simple example. Assume there are two 
goods X and Y, two countries Home (H) and Foreign (F), the only factor of pro-
duction is labour, and the labour requirements to produce one good X and Y 
are: 
Labour requirements 
X Y 
Country H 20 20 
Country F 10 30 
Country F has an absolute advantage in the production of good X and 
country H has an absolute advantage in the production of good Y. According 
to this theory the countries specialize in goods in which they have an absolute 
advantage and consumers maximize their utility through international trade. 
2.1.2 Comparative advantage (Ricardo) 
David Ricardo showed the shortcomings of the theory of absolute advan-
tage by demonstrating that trade is also possible and beneficial when one 
country has an absolute advantage in both goods, but when the efficiency gap 
is not the same for both goods. 
Basic assumptions 
Production factors: one production factor, labour (domestically mobile 
and internationally immobile) 
Sector/goods: two homogeneous goods (X and Y) 
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Economies of scale: constant returns to scale 
Technology: fixed labour requirements to produce each of both goods, these 
requirements differ between goods and between countries. No technological 
change. 
Knowledge spillovers: no 
Consumer preferences: identical across income and between countries 
Market structure: perfect competition on both factor and good markets. 
Main mechanism 
Just as in the absolute advantage theory, the main mechanism in the clas-
sical theory of comparative advantage is the difference in production technol-
ogy between countries. 
The technology of an economy is summarized by the productivity in la-
bour in each industry and comparative advantage is the result of international 
differences in labour productivity. A country has a comparative advantage in 
producing good X when its ratio of labour requirements in good X to that in 
good Y is lower than in an other (foreign) country, i.e. the home country's rela-
tive labour productivity in good X is higher than in the other country. We can 
illustrate the principle of comparative advantage with the fol lowing example. 
Labour requirements 
X Y 
Country H 5 5 
Country F 10 30 
Country H has an absolute advantage in both goods and according to the 
theory of absolute advantage trade is not possible. However, the relative eff i-
ciency differences between good X and Y are not equal between the countries. 
In country F it costs the economy three times as much to produce one unit of 
Y as it does to produce one unit of X (pf=Px/ PY= 1/3). In country H the labour 
cost of production are equal (ph= 1/1). These relative efficiency differences cre-
ate possibilities of profitable exchange between the two countries. If the world 
price (pw ) is equal to V2 then it is possible to exchange two units of good X for 
one unit of good Y. This world price is profitable for country H because it can 
obtain 2 units of good X for one unit of good Y, while in production it can 
obtain only one unit of X by giving up one unit of Y. Therefore, despite coun-
try H having an absolute advantage in the production of both goods, trade is 
nevertheless profitable for this country; it is profitable for country H to special-
ize in commodity Y and import commodity X. Country F on the other hand can 
obtain more units of Y for one unit of X by trading than by producing. It is 
therefore profitable for country F to specialize in good X and import good Y. 
Although country F does not have an absolute advantage in the production of 
either of the two commodities, she has a comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of good X, in the sense that X can be produced relatively less expensively 
than in country H. Therefore trade creates profitable possibilities for both 
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countries despite that one country is more efficient in producing both goods. 
The observation that trade depends only on comparative advantage and not 
on absolute advantage is one of the major contributions of Ricardo. 
Implications 
Gains from trade 
In the absence of trade, the relative prices of both goods in each country 
are determined by the relative unit labour requirements. We can illustrate this 
wi th figure 2.1 in which the production possibility curve (PPC) for country H is 
depicted (total amount of labour in country H is equal to 50). Before trade the 
autarky equilibrium price ratio is tangent to the community indifference curve 
(l0) and the production possibility curve. In this case the tangency is indepen-
dent of the equilibrium point (A) and fully determined by the slope of the PPC. 
Therefore, only cost conditions determine the relative domestic price level be-
fore trade. The pre-trade relative price (Px/ PY) is therefore pf= 1/3 in country F 
and ph= 1 in country H. The normal result of trade is that the equilibrium world 
price ( p j ends up somewhere between the pre-trade levels in the two coun-
tries (p f< pw< Ph) 1). A possible world equilibrium price is included in figure 2.1. 
This world price implies that country H completely specializes in the production 
of good Y (production point is point C) and consumes where the indifference 
curve is tangent to the world price (point B). The consumption point after trade 
is associated with a higher utility level (!,>!(,), so country H gains from trade (the 
same is true for country F, however this country specializes in good X). 
Both countries derive gains from trade from this specialization because 
by producing the good in which it has a higher relative labour productivity and 
trading this good for an other good in which it has a relative lower productiv-
ity. This is a more efficient method than direct production of the good with a 
lower productivity and it increases the consumption possibilities in both coun-
tries. 
The total gains from trade (movement from A to C) can be divided into 
gains from exchange and gains from specialization. Gains from exchange occur 
if one can obtain a higher utility level by simply changing one commodity for 
another. In figure 2.2 this 'gains from exchange effect' is depicted by the move-
ment from A to D: the production stays in point A while the price level changes 
from the pretrade to the world price level. The movement from D to B repre-
sent the gains from specialization; country H specializes in the production of 
good Y (movement from A to C) while the price level stays the same. 
The gains from trade for a country are dependent on the world price 
level. If the world price level is equal to the autarky level (pw = ph) then there 
are no gains from trade for this country because the consumption (and the 
associated indifference curve) stays in point A (figure 2.1). If the world price 
1) Note that at any price ratio outside this range, both countries would want to 
specialize in the production of the same commodity, and this could not possibly 
lead to an equilibrium situation. 
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declines (the relative price of good Y, the export product of the home country, 
increases) the terms of trade of country H improves (the relative price of its 
export product increases) and country H obtains a higher indifference curve 
(for example movement from A to B). Therefore the world price determines 
how much a country will gain from trade and how the gains from trade are 
divided over the countries. 
In contrast to the autarky price level, which is only determined by supply 
conditions, the equilibrium world price level is determinated by supply and 
demand conditions. The offer curves for both countries reflect the excess de-
mand (imports) or excess supply (exports) for both commodities. These offer 
curves for country H and F are depicted in figure 2.3. The world price is deter-
mined where both offer curves intersect; point E (import or excess demand for 
good Y by country H is equal to export or excess supply of good X by country 
F, and vice versa for product X). Because the world price is important for the 
division of the gains from trade over countries, we consider a few determinants 
of the equilibrium price: 
demand preferences 
If the demand preferences in country H shift towards good X (indifference 
curves shift to the X-axis) then the offer curve for country H shifts from OAFhto 
OA'F'h (figure 2.4). The world price level increases from p to p' (relative price of 
good X increases) and the terms of trade for country H deteriorates. In general, 
shifts in demand toward; the import commodity will tend to deteriorate the 
terms of trade and reduce the gains from trade; 
size of countries 
If country H gets bigger (increase in labour) its PPC shifts outwards and the 
offer curve shift from OAFhto OA'F'h. Therefore an increase in labour deterio-
rates the terms of trade. If country H gets even bigger and bigger then the 
offer curve of country F intersects the offer curve of country H in the flat part 
of the offer curve and the world price level becomes equal to the pre-trade 
level of the large country. The large country does not gain from trade in this 
situation. Therefore, both countries will specialize completely when the world 
price is between the cost ratios of the two countries, this is only possible if both 
countries have the capability of producing a large enough quantity of one of 
the goods to satisfy world demand; 
production technology 
Changes in the production technology in general change the slope of the pro-
duction possibility curve. A small increase in labour productivity from the im-
port good does not change the terms of trade. An increase in the labour pro-
ductivity of the export goods shifts the offer curve again from OAFh to OA'F'h 
and deteriorates the terms of trade. 
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Figure 2.1 Ricardian trade model Figure 2.2 Gains from exchange and 
specialization in the Ricardian 
trade model 
x o 
Figure 2.3 Determination of the world Figure 2.4 Demand and supply factors 
price in the Ricardian model influence the world price in the 
Ricardian model 
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Policy 
The main policy message from this theory is that a country should avoid 
anything that may restrict trade with other countries. The governmental poli-
cies should be as non-distortive as possible as nonintervention in trade is con-
sidered to be the optimal way to benefit from the gains of trade. These gains 
are obvious, according to the model and are best served by free trade. 
Only when a country can influence its terms of trade or when there are 
domestic distortions (externalities), trade policy can be beneficial for a country. 
These arguments are the same for all the traditional theories and these are 
therefore treated in section 2.3. 
2.2 Neo-classical theory 
2.2.1 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory provides important insights into 
the relationship between commodity trade and factor endowments. 
Basic assumptions: 
Two production factors: labour and capital (both factors are domestically 
mobile and internationally immobile). Initial factor endowments (apparent in 
capital/labour ratios) differ between countries. 
Economies of scale: constant returns to scale 
Technology: production functions are different for the two commodities (factor 
intensities reflected in capital/labour ratios differ between goods) but identical 
across countries. No technological change. 
Knowledge spillovers: no 
Consumer preferences: homothetic 1) and identical between countries. 
Market structure: perfect competition. 
Main mechanism 
The central explanation for trade in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Sa-
muelson (H-O-S) model is the difference in factor endowments between coun-
tries. Taking into account all the assumptions, these differences in factor en-
dowments lead to different factor prices and different prices of goods between 
countries. Because prices of goods differ there's a reason for trade. Let us illus-
trate this with the following example. Assume that factor endowments differ 
between countries and between goods. Then there is a relatively labour-abun-
dant and a relatively capital-abundant country and a relatively labour-intensive 
and a capital intensive good. In autarky, the relative factor price of labour to 
capital will be lower in the labour-abundant country. The labour-intensive 
good wil l therefore be relatively cheaper in this country. As in the Ricardian 
theory when relative good prices differ, there is an incentive for trade. 
1) Similar tastes between income levels. 
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We can elaborate this principle wi th the following illustration. Assume a 
two goods (X and Y) and two countries (Home and Foreign) model 1). Country 
H is relatively capital abundant and Country F is labour abundant. Good Y is 
capital intensive and good X is labour intensive. The product possibility curves 
of country H and F and the indifference curves are depicted in figure 2.5. 
In the autarky situation, the relative price of good X to Y for country H 
and F is given by the price lines Ph en Pf (price lines are determined by the tan-
gency of product possibility curves and indifference curves). Given these rela-
tive prices, country H produces and consumes Yha and Xha while country F pro-
duces and consumes Yfa and Xfa. Therefore in the autarky situation the relative 
price of good X to Y is higher in country H (P„/Py for H >P„/Py for F). According 
to the principle of comparative advantage, country H wil l export good Y and 
country F will export good X. Because the demand for good Y (X) increases in 
country H (F) the relative price ratio of X to Y will decrease (increase). When 
trade expands, each country's exporting sector grows and the import-compet-
ing sector contracts. Factors of production move in the same direction and re-
sult in income-distribution effects. Because the export sector uses relatively 
more of the abundant factor, the relative factor price of this factor will increase 
and therefore the relative price of the export good increases. This process will 
continue until the relative prices in both countries are the same (world price is 
Pwin figure 2.5). 
In the trade equilibrium H produces Yhp and consumes Yhc and wil l there-
fore export Yhp - Yhc to country F. Country F produces Yfp and consumes Yfc and 
will import Yfc - Yfp = Yhp - Yhc For good X it is the other way around. It is impor-
tant to know that trade enables each country to reach a higher indifference 
curve (I, in stead of l0). 
Implications 
From the above illustration of the H-O-S theorem several conclusions can 
be draw: 
1. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
Given the assumptions of the model a country exports the good which 
uses most intensive it's abundant factor of production. In our example, 
the labour (capital) abundant country F (H) will export the labour (capi-
tal) intensive good X (Y) and will import the capital (labour) intensive 
good Y (X). 
2. The factor-price-equalization theorem 
Relative factor prices will be the same across countries in the trade equi-
librium. As in our example, in the trade equilibrium relative good prices 
are the same in both countries. With the same production technology 
and constant returns to scale this is only possible when factor prices are 
identical. 
1) This model with 2 goods, 2 factors, 2 countries is considered to be the basic H-O-
model. 
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H = production possibility curve of country H 
F = production possibility curve of country F 
l0 = indifference curve in autarky 
I, = indifference curve with trade 
Ph = Px /Py for country H, pre-trade relative price of X to Y 
Pf = Px /Py for country F, pre-trade relative price of X to Y 
Pw= Px/Py in the trade equilibrium 
Figuur 2.5 Relation between factor intensity and trade 
3. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
An increase in the relative price of a good increases the factor reward of 
the factor which is used intensively and decreases the reward of the other 
factor. 
A combination of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and the Stolper-Samuel-
son theorem implies that the scarce production factor in a country will 
loose from trade and the abundant production factor will gain from 
trade. 
5. The Rybczynski theorem 
An exogenous increase in the supply of one production factor leads to an 
increase in the production of the good that uses this production factor 
intensively and to a decrease of the other good. 
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6. Trade wil l increase the welfare of both countries 
In our example both countries reach a higher indifference curve in the 
trade equilibrium. This is caused by a more rational allocation of produc-
tive resources and lower relative prices for the import competing product. 
Policy 
The traditional theories explain trade as a result of differences between 
countries. By using these differences between countries trade is beneficial to 
all countries. The less barriers to trade there are, the more beneficial trade will 
be. Free trade policy is therefore the best trade policy under normal conditions 
(arguments for trade policy are treated in section 2.3). 
2.2.2 Specific factors model 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that all production factors can move 
freely between sectors, which is clearly a long run feature. In the short run capi-
tal is not perfectly mobile because capital used in agriculture is quite different 
from capital used in making cars. In the short run specific-factor model, there 
are two factors of production, labour is mobile between sectors, but capital is 
assumed to be immobile and therefore good-specific. 
Another interpretation is that the specific factors model represents Ricar-
dian technological differences. Now, the resemblance with the Ricardo model 
is striking. The only difference is that Ricardo assumes a fixed marginal product 
to the mobile factor labour whereas this so-called Ricardo-Viner model assumes 
diminishing marginal products to labour. 
A third interpretation of the specific-factor model is that this model ex-
plains trade flows when there are really specific factors from their own nature. 
Trade based on natural resources is an example of this interpretation. 
Basic assumptions 
Three production factors: labour (domestically mobile), two kinds of capi-
tal (good specific); all factors are internationally immobile. Initial factor endow-
ments differ between countries. 
Sector goods: 2 homogeneous goods 
Economies of scale: constant returns to scale. 
Technology: production functions are different for the two commodities but 
identical across countries. No technological change. 
Knowledge Spillovers: no. 
Consumer preferences: homothetic and identical between countries. 
Market structure: perfect competition on goods and factor markets. 
Main mechanism 
In contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the international trade pattern 
can not be predicted from initial factor endowments alone. The specialization 
pattern is also dependent on the nature of the production functions and the 
allocation of capital between the two industries. 
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Implications 
The Heckscher Ohlin theorem does not always hold. A relative labour-
abundant country will not always export the labour intensive commodity. 
The implications of the specific-factor model also differ from those of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model on the field of income-distribution. Trade raises 
the relative price of the good in which the country has a comparative 
advantage (say good X). The mobile factor labour moves into sector X 
and this raises the income of the specific factor in this sector. For the 
good Y the results are just the opposite. Therefore, trade is beneficial for 
the specific factor that is necessary to produce the export good and it 
reduces the income of the specific factor used in the import good. 
The marginal product of labour (the real return to labour) has fallen in 
the export sector X and risen in the import sector Y. The welfare of a 
worker will depend on the consumption pattern. If the consumer prefers 
the export good X which price has increased, the welfare of the consumer 
declines, when the consumers prefers the import product Y the welfare 
increases. Therefore the welfare implications from trade on labour are 
ambiguous. 
An increase in the endowment of one of the specific factors reduces the 
real income of both specific factors and increases the real income of la-
bour the mobile factor (even if we keep the relative price ratio un-
changed). This is in contrast wi th the Heckscher-Ohlin model in which 
endowment changes do not influence factor prices when the relative 
price ratio remains unchanged. 
An increase in the amount of labour reduces the return to labour and 
increase the return to both the specific factors. 
An increase in one of the specific factors increases the output of the in-
dustry that uses this factor and reduces the output of the other industry. 
An increase in the supply of labour increases both outputs. The first effect 
is conform the Rybczynski theorem and the second effect is in contrast 
wi th this theorem. 
The equalization of commodity prices by international trade does not 
equalize factor prices. 
Policy 
Again free trade policy is the best for a country's welfare. 
2.3 Trade policy under perfect competition 
In the traditional theory wi th perfect competition free trade is the best 
policy from a world point of view. However, for an individual country trade 
policy can be beneficial under the following conditions. First, if a country can 
influence the world price (i.e. a 'large country' case), it can improve its terms of 
trade (terms of trade argument) at its trading partners' expense. Second, trade 
policy can be used to correct for domestic distortions. Third, trade policy can 
also be desired for political reasons. 
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1. Trade policies when a country can improve its terms of trade 
- A tariff raises the domestic price level which generates tariff revenues 
at the expense of consumer surpluses. The net effect contains two ele-
ments. On the hand, there is a (consumer) distortion loss through the 
wedge between supply and demand and on the other hand, there is 
a terms of trade gain because importers lower their price. For small 
tariffs, the second effect (first order effect) dominates the first effect 
(second order effect) and a tariff is therefore beneficial. For larger tar-
iffs, the opposite is true. Therefore, there is an optimal tariff for a large 
country (e.g. Corden, 1971). 
- An import quota is equivalent to a tariff only if all the rents are col-
lected by the domestic economy. If this is not the case, a quota (or a 
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER)) is worse than a tariff because the 
rents are taken by foreigners (Bhagwati, 1965). 
- An export subsidy is never beneficial because it worsens the terms of 
trade and it creates (production) distortion effects. The right policy is 
an export tax which can compensate the distortion loss with an im-
provement of the terms of trade. Again, the second effect dominates 
the first and a small export tax is beneficial. 
2. Domestic distortion and trade policy 
Market failures or domestic distortions cause that consumer and producer 
surplus do not accurately measure social costs and benefits. Trade policy 
can be useful to correct for these distortions. There are two main types 
of market distortions. First, there are imperfections in factor markets (dif-
ferences in wages among industries, unemployment, etc.). Second, there 
are external economies: technological spillovers between firms, learning 
effects and negative externalities such as pollution. 
Trade policy can shift production to activities with positive externalities 
and out of activities with negative externalities. This creates an additional 
welfare gain in addition to all the effects mentioned in the case of the 
terms of trade argument. This means that all trade policies can become 
beneficial even when there is no terms of trade effect (small country as-
sumption). However, trade policy will always be a second best policy, 
because a production subsidy can achieve the same result without gener-
ating the consumer distortion. 
3. Trade policy for political reasons: 
Sometimes trade policy is used to achieve political goals: 
- National defence: you need certain industries because their output is 
vital in time of war when foreign supplies are unavailable. 
- Income-distribution: Sometimes trade policy is desired to achieve a 
more desirable income-distribution or to avoid undesirable income-dis-
tribution effects of trade. As in the case with distortions, trade policy 
is only a second best policy whereas income-distribution policy is the 
first best policy. 
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2.4 Empirics 
Test of the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage 
There are a number of ways in which the Ricardian model makes mislead-
ing preconditions (for example: that an extreme degree of specialization wil l 
occur, or that, ignoring income-distributional effects of international trade 
within countries, countries as a whole always gain from trade) and, obviously, 
the Ricardian one-factor model is far too simple to be a complete analysis of 
either the causes or the effects of international trade. But according to Krug-
man and Obstfeld (1994:29) the basic prediction of the model - that countries 
should tend to export those goods in which their productivity is relatively high -
has been strongly confirmed by a number of studies (for evidence, the authors 
refer to studies by MacDougall, 1951/52, MacDougall et al., 1962, and Balassa, 
1963). Therefore, Krugman and Obstfeld conclude that, also because of its rela-
tive simplicity, a focus on relative labour productivities can be a very useful tool 
in thinking about international trade. Learner (1994), however, is less convinced 
by the evidence from these empirical studies. To his opinion, first, 'the Ricar-
dian model is not sensibly interpreted literally' in the empirical work and, sec-
ond, 'the studies are done without referring adequately to the range of alter-
native hypotheses that might be considered.' (Learner, 1994:71-72). Therefore, 
Learner concludes that what we may have learned from this empirical work on 
the classical comparative cost theory is 'not too much' (1994:71). 
Testing the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
The H-0 theorem is a three-way relationship of factor abundance, factor 
intensity and trade. A proper test must therefore include all three of them. 
Few, if any investigators have managed this and therefore what we have is a 
large body of evidence that is suggestive buthardly conclusive as to the empiri-
cally validation of the H-0 theorem (Dearpdorff, 1984). Although the study 
does not include a measuring of factor endowments, the work of Leontief 
(1953) is considered as a first, comprehensive empirical application of the H-0 
theorem. He used an input-output table for the US economy to measure the 
capital and labour embodied in US exports and import substitutes. He found 
that the ratio of capital to labour embodied in US exports was smaller than 
that embodied in import substitutes, while USA was supposed to be a capital-
abundant and labour-scarce country. The debate that followed from this 'para-
dox' concentrated mainly on the method Leontief applied. Several authors 
have reapplied Leontief 's basic methodology and the results have typically reaf-
firmed the paradox in the early years but found that it may have disappeared 
by 1970 (see Dear^dorff, 1984: 480-485, also for references). As a byproduct of 
Leontief's results and the debate that followed, the H-O theorem has been 
extended to allow for additional factors beyond just capital and labour to ex-
plain trade, or make a clearer distinction between skilled, unskilled labour, 
human and physical capital as factors determining international trade flows. 
An important step towards resolving the 'Leontief paradox' has not been 
as much the acknowledgement of additional factors of production that may 
explain Leontief's results, but the notion by Learner (1980) that the US in Leon-
40 
t iefs data was a net exporter of both capital and labour. A trade surplus makes 
it possible for a country to be a net exporter even of the services of factors with 
which it is relatively poorly endowed. Learner shows that when this happens, 
the ratios of factors embodied in exports and imports need bear no particular 
relationship to relative factor endowments. Then a capital abundant country 
need not embody a higher ratio of capital to labour in its exports than its im-
ports and Leontief's results are not paradoxical at all. Instead Learner shows 
that a valid test of the unbalanced trade must be stated in terms of the factor 
ratios embodied in production versus consumption, rather than exports versus 
imports. Taking this approach to Leontief's data he finds that the US was a net 
exporter of both labour and capital services and that the capital-labour ratio 
embodied in production was indeed greater than that embodied in consump-
t ion (Learner illustrates his analysis wi th a three-factor numerical example, 
which is corrected later by Heravi, 1986, see Learner, 1994). The presumed 
abundance of US capital relative to labour is supported after all and the para-
dox disappears. 
More recently Bowen et al. (1987) have attempted to test the H-O-model 
using data for 27 countries and 12 factors of production. Their study is based 
on the idea that trading goods are actually an indirect way of trading factors 
of production. According to the H-O-theory, by calculating factors of produc-
tion embodied in a country's exports and imports, a country is expected to be 
a net exporter of the factors of production with which it is relatively abundant U 
endowed, and a net importer of those with which it is relatively poorly en-
dowed. Bowen et al. calculated the ratio of each country's endowment of each 
factor to the world supply. They then compared these ratios wi th each coun-
try's share of world income. If the factor proportions theory were right, a coun-
try would always export factors for which the factor share exceeded the income 
share and import factors for which it was less. However, the outcome of one 
of the key tests in Bowen et al. is that for two-thirds of the factors of produc-
tion, trade ran in the predicted direction less than 70 percent of the time. This 
results confirm the Leontief paradox on global scale: trade does not run in the 
direction the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem predicts. 
Three empirical observations that contradict the implications of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory 
1. The first empirical observation is that major trade flows occur among 
countries with practically the same factor proportions. However, accord-
ing the H-O-S theory the volume of trade is expected to be larger de-
pending on the differences between countries. 
2. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) discovered that intra-industry trade is empirically 
significant and its proportion of total world trade has grown over time. 
However, the H-O-S model can only explain inter-industry trade and not 
intra-industry trade. 
3. Income-distribution effects of trade are small. However, the H-O-S model 
predicted that there are large income redistribution effects associated 
with trade. 
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Tests of the specific factors model 
Tests of this model do not differ much from tests of the Ricardo model if 
one assumes the specific factors to be fixed over time (again the relation be-
tween labour productivity and trade is central). There have been no tests of the 
specific factors model, however, a study to the relation between international 
events and the allocation of new investments could be interesting (Learner, 
1994). 
Conclusion 
Sofar the results of empirical tests of the pure H-O-theory have shown to 
be rather disappointing and there are no tests of the specific-factor model at 
all. At the same time, empirical evidence supports the Ricardian model's predic-
tion that countries will export goods in which their labour is especially produc-
tive. Although the limitations of the Ricardian model are widely acknowl-
edged, Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) conclude from these tests that the trade 
pattern is largely driven by international differences in technology rather than 
resources. However, it is still important to ask what factors are embodied in a 
country's exports and imports, as trade affects income-distribution. The H-O-
model and the specific-factor model, therefore, retain but to a more limited 
use, as a way of predicting the income-distribution effects of trade and trade 
policy. 
Woods (1994) counteracts the proposition that H-0 theorem is inaccurate 
to explain global trade patterns. He argues that the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory probably provides a much better description of reality than is usually 
supposed by empirical tests of the H-0 theory, suggesting that the H-O theory 
performs badly. Woods states that H-0 models are likely to work better if capi-
tal - defined as finance - is excluded than if it is included in the usual, wrong, 
way. Capital is usually considered to be an immobile production factor, like 
land and labour. However, financial capital is internationally mobile and, there-
fore, does not generally influence the pattern of trade. Skill availability mat-
ters, according to Wood, in explaining North-South trade in manufactures, not 
capital. He suggests that a skill-only H-0 model can explain the commodity 
composition of North-South trade in manufactures rather well. His hypothesis 
is that the North, because of its larger supply of skilled (relative to unskilled) 
labour, exports skilled-intensive manufactures from the South, and imports 
(unskilled) labour-intensive manufactures. Woods finds evidence for his hypoth-
esis that North-South trade is based on differences in the abundance of skills. 
His conclusion is that when the H-0 theory is correctly specified - excluding 
capital - it provides 'an accurate and illuminating description of a large part of 
the global pattern of trade' (Woods, 1994:20). 
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3. MODERN TRADE THEORIES 
3.1 Economies of scale and imperfect competition 
Trade need not be the result of comparative advantage. Instead, it can 
result from increasing returns or economies of scale. An industry is character-
ized by economies of scale when doubling of inputs more than doubles the 
industry's production. Economies of scale provide an incentive for international 
trade by concentrating production on a limited number of goods. This enables 
a country to produce these goods more efficiently than if it tried to produce 
everything for itself. These specialized economies then trade with each other 
to be able to consume the full range of goods. 
Economies of scale and market structure 
However, economies of scale as a determinant for international trade was 
known for a long time. The problem was that economies of scale are inconsis-
tent wi th the perfect competition standard Neo-classical model because they 
imply a different market structure, namely imperfect competition. 
In the first and oldest departure from the standard model economies of 
scale were assumed to be external to the firm. These so-called 'external econo-
mies of scale' occur when the cost per unit depends on the size of the industry 
but not necessarily on the size of the firm. An industry where economies of 
scale are wholly external (where there are no advantages to large firms) wil l 
typically consists of many small firms and be perfectly competitive. This is the 
Marshallian approach to increasing returns (see Krugman, 1990:65-74). The 
early literature on the Marshallian approach (the early postwar period), how-
ever, seemed discouraging in that even with the simplest assumptions it 
seemed to lead to welter of multiple equilibria. Only since the work of Ethier 
(1979, 1982) it has become clear that under certain circumstances it is possible 
to bring order to this complexity. The new version of the Marshallian approach 
distinguishes from the older approach by the way that it works from resource 
allocation to trade. By assuming that a trading world reproduces the aggregate 
outcomes of a hypothetical perfectly integrated economy it follows that both 
factor proportions and scale economies contribute to international trade and 
both are sources of gains from trade. 
In the second departure economies of scale at the firm level are assumed. 
Internal economies of scale give large firms a cost advantage over small and 
lead to an imperfectly competitive market structure. Within this approach there 
are two directions. The first direction concentrates on modelling economies of 
scale and treats market imperfections as simple as possible by assuming monop-
olistic competition (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). A 
second direction concentrates on imperfect competition and uses economies 
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of scale to cause these market imperfections. The main market structure they 
use is 'Cournot' or 'Bertrand' oligopoly (Brander and Spencer, 1985; Helpman 
and Krugman, 1989). 
3.1.1 External economies of scale 
Basic assumptions 
Production factors: labour (and capital): this factor is domestically mobile 
and internationally immobile. Initial endowments of countries may be identi-
cal. 
Sector/goods: 2 homogeneous goods 
Economies of scale: one good produced with constant returns to scale, the 
other good with external economies of scale which are country specific. 
Technology: different across goods and identical production functions between 
countries, no technological change; 
Knowledge spillovers: no 
Consumer preferences: identical across incomes and between countries 
Market structure: perfect competition in good and factor markets 
Main mechanism 
External economies are economies of scale that occur at the level of the 
industry instead of the firm. To keep it as simple as possible, imagine a world 
with two countries, two goods and one factor of production (labour). Good A 
is produced with external economies of scale and good B is produced with con-
stant returns to scale at the firm and industry level. Assume further that both 
countries have the same production techniques and that both countries pro-
duce both goods. The fact that both countries produce good B implies equal 
wages. But this means that whichever country had the larger A industry would 
have lower costs in that industry. Trade will cause the relative size of that in-
dustry to increase still further; economies of scale reinforce the relative cost 
advantage of this industry, now trade expands. This process is going on until 
at least one country specializes. So, increasing returns leads to specialization 
and trade. 
Implications 
1. Trade is possible between identical countries (same factor endowments, 
technologies and tastes). 
2. With external economies of scale the direction of specialization is often 
unknown. This theory gives an important role to history and accident in 
determining the pattern of international trade. When external econo-
mies are important, a country starting with a large industry may retain 
that advantage even if another country could potentially produce the 
same goods more cheaply. 
3. The implications for the wage level in both countries are ambiguous. If 
in the trade equilibrium both countries produce the good with constant 
returns to scale, the wages in both countries will be equal and higher 
than before trade. If one country specializes in the good produced with 
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external economies of scale and for which demand is high, than the rela-
tive price of this product will increase, and wages of this country wil l rise 
relative to the other country. Real wages in the other country may still 
rise (through gains from specialization and gains from exchange), how-
ever, if they consume a lot of the more expensive goods, their real wages 
may even decline. 
4. An implication of these real wage movements is that the division of wel-
fare between countries is very unequal and very dependent on the spe-
cialization pattern. Countries can even lose from trade. 
Policy 
A country may specialize in goods that are less desirable in terms of wel-
fare. Trade or industrial policy can reverse the initial cost advantage and there-
fore reverse the specialization pattern. In this case trade and industrial policies 
can be beneficial. 
Trade policy can even be desirable from a world point of view. This hap-
pens when a small country has an initial advantage in the sector with external 
economies of scale and demand for this product is large. The sector wi th the 
external economies of scale will be situated in the small country, but the coun-
try is too small to achieve the optimal scale from a world point of view and 
production costs will therefore be higher than necessarily. 
Empirics 
Identification of external economies is very difficult. As a matter of fact, 
externalities are inherently hard to measures as by definition they do not leave 
any trace in market transactions. Still there are some examples which give evi-
dence of the importance of external economies. Such examples are the concen-
tration of semiconductor manufacturers in California's 'Silicon Valley', and the 
concentration of financial and banking firms in London and New York. 
Some of the most important external economies probably arises from the 
accumulation and spillovers of knowledge: production costs of individual firms 
fall as the industry as a whole accumulates experience. Dynamic scale econo-
mies, like external economies at a point in time, potentially justify protection-
ism. The argument for temporary protection of industries to enable them to 
gain experience is known as the infant industry argument. 
3.1.2 Internal economies of scale and imperfect competition 
3.1.2.1 Monopolistic competition 
With monopolistic competition, an industry contains a sufficiently large 
number of 'similar' firms producing differentiated products and profits are 
competed away in the equilibrium. Products can be differentiated in two man-
ners. On the one side, each consumer has a taste for many different varieties, 
this is the so-called 'love of variety approach' (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Spence 
1976). Product differentiation in this case is only producing a different variety. 
On the other side, each consumer has its own preferred mix of attributes, this 
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is the so-called 'diversity of tastes approach' (Lancaster 1980). In this case prod-
uct differentiation shows up by products that consist of different attributes. 
Although the latter approach has the advantage of greater realism, the former 
approach is mostly used because it can be modelled more easily. 
With product differentiation each product is unique, therefore some fixed 
costs are assumed to produce this product (internal economies of scale). Be-
cause product differentiation is possible, firms have some monopoly power 
(downward sloping demand curve). However, additional firms can enter a prof-
itable industry until monopoly profits are competed away (profits are equal to 
fixed costs). The number of firms in the equilibrium are therefore dependent 
on the size of the market (a large market will support a larger number of 
firms), the amount of fixed costs (larger fixed costs will decrease the number 
of firms) and the degree of product differentiation (if differentiation is valued 
very much by consumers, more products will be there in the equilibrium). 
The number of firms in a monopolistically competitive market, and the 
prices they charge, are determined by two relationships. On the one side, the 
more firms there are, the more intensively they compete and hence the lower 
the industry price is. This relationship is presented by PP (see figure 3.1). On the 
other side, the more firms there are, the less each firm sells (given the size of 
the market) and therefore the higher its average cost. This relationship is pre-
sented by CC. If price exceeds average cost, the industry will be making profit 
and additional firms will be entering the industry; if the price is less than aver-
age cost, the industry will be incurring losses and firms will leave the industry. 
The long-run equilibrium price and number of firms occurs when price equals 
average cost, at the intersection of PP and CC. 
Basic assumptions 
Production factors: labour (and capital): this factor is domestically mobile 
and internationally immobile. Initial factor endowments of countries are identi-
cal in backbone model. 
Sector/goods: n differentiated products. 
Economies of scale: increasing returns to scale at f irm level. 
Technology: identical across goods and countries, no technological change. 
Knowledge spillovers: no. 
Market structure: monopolistic competition in good markets and perfect com-
petition in factor markets. 
Consumer preferences: identical across incomes and between countries. 
Main mechanism 
To concentrate on the mechanism caused by product differentiation and 
internal economies of scale we assume identical factor endowments between 
countries. We take the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption that each consumer has a taste 
for many different varieties of a product. Product differentiation of product A 
causes each country to produce a different set of varieties of product A. Be-
cause each country is assumed to demand all varieties (consumers have a 'love 
of variety') each country exports each of its own varieties and imports each of 
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the varieties of the other country 1) So, there will be 'intra-industry' trade. This 
intra-industry trade is essentially caused by scale economies. If there were no 
scale economies each country would be able to produce all varieties of product 
A itself. But the existence of scale economies make sure that each variety must 
be concentrated in one country. So, it is the combination of scale effects and 
the specification of the product differentiation process which causes intra-in-
dustry trade. 
Besides the increased number of varieties available to consumers, a sec-
ond possible gain from trade could be an increased scale of production which 
together with internal increasing returns to scale implies lower average costs. 
Whether or not the scale of production will increase is dependent on the spe-
cific formulations of, for example, the product differentiation function (Help-
man, 1981). With Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (constant elasticity of demand), 
trade offers greater variety but not greater scale. With Lancaster preferences, 
trade leads often to a more elastic demand: in this case, a larger market leads 
to greater diversity and lower average costs (Helpman, 1981). 
The case when the scale of production increases after trade is represented 
by a downward shift in CC in figure 3.2. The result is a simultaneous increase 
in the number of firms (and hence in the variety of goods available) and a fall 
1) In the monopolistic competition model each firm makes a unique product becau-
se it is not profitable to enter the market with a product that already exists. 
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in the price of each good. The integrated market supports more firms, each 
producing at a larger scale and selling at a lower price, than either national 
market did on its own. 
Implications: 
1. Even with identical resource endowments, trade is possible. All trade in 
this case is intra-industry trade and the precise pattern of trade is indeter-
minate (which country exports which variety). 
2. Gains from trade appear in the form of: 
- Increased product variety. 
- Potential higher scale of production which results in lower average 
costs. 
3. In a model where both internal economies of scale and relative factor 
endowments are present, intra-industry trade is caused by monopolistic 
competition in combination with scale effects and inter-industry trade is 
caused by the traditional H-O-S model. Intra-industry trade is more impor-
tant between similar countries and inter-industry trade becomes more 
important the greater the difference in relative factor endowments. 
4. Intra-industry trade does not generate the same strong effects on in-
come-distribution as inter-industry trade. In the models describing com-
parative advantage, trade had all its effects through changes in relative 
prices, which in turn have strong income-distributional effects (scarce fac-
tors lose from trade). However, when 1) countries are similar in their rela-
tive factor supplies so that there is not much inter-industry trade and 
when 2) scale economies and product differentiation are important, so 
that possible gains from larger scale and an increased choice are large, 
intra-industry trade is the dominant source of gains from trade. In these 
circumstances, the income-distribution effects of trade will be small and 
there will be substantial extra gains from intra-industry trade. The result 
may well be that despite the effects of trade on income-distribution, ev-
eryone (the owner of the abundant and of the scarce factor) gains from 
trade. Because intra-industry trade will be dominant between countries 
at a similar level of economic development, trade without serious in-
come-distributional effects is most likely to happen in manufactures trade 
between advanced industrial countries (for example the Common Market 
of the EU). 
5. It is possible to treat multinationals and trade in technology in these 
models. Investment in knowledge is hard to model except as a kind of 
fixed cost. In the monopolistic competition models it is possible that firms 
in one country develop a product and sell the knowledge about this 
product abroad. In the foreign country a new monopolistic competitor 
enters on the basis of this knowledge (Feenstra and Judd, 1982). For some 
knowledge this is not possible and knowledge can be only transferred 
within a f irm. This results in the existence of multinational enterprises 
(MNE) (Helpman, 1985). 
6. Transport costs: when there are transport costs the size of the market has 
an important influence on trade patterns. Ceteris paribus, countries ex-
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port products for which they have a large home market (Krugman, 1980; 
Helpman en Krugman, 1985). 
3.1.2.2 Oligopolistic competition 
Basic assumptions 
Production factors: no assumptions about production factors in most 
models. 
Sector/goods: two or a few products. 
Economies of scale: increasing returns to scale at firm level (but not in Brander/-
Krugman's (1983) model). 
Technology: identical across goods and countries, no technological change. 
Knowledge spillovers: no. 
Market structure: oligopolistic (usually Cournot) competition in good market 
and perfect competition in factor markets. In Brander/Krugman model a Cour-
not duopoly is assumed. 
Consumer preferences: identical across incomes and between countries. 
Main mechanism 
In this approach it is normally assumed that internal economies of scale 
lead to an oligopolistic market structure. In such markets the behaviour of a 
firm has influence on the behaviour of other firms. In the international trade 
theory most of the time it is assumed that firms behave in a Cournot fashion: 
imperfectly competitive firms take each others' output as given. 
One of the main elements in this theory is the relation between trade and 
market power. If firms compete in the Cournot fashion its price will be higher 
than marginal costs by a mark-up that depends on the perceived elasticity of 
demand per firm. When trade occurs each firm becomes part of a larger more 
competitive market and it will perceive a higher elasticity of demand, leading 
it to expand output and to setting a lower price. Therefore, trade or 'potential' 
trade reduces monopolistic distortions. This effect is called the 'pro-competi-
tive' effect. 
Dixit and Norman (1980) show that there are two effects of opening 
trade in a Cournot market wi th increasing returns to scale. On the one hand 
the number of firms in each market will be reduced because a lower mark-up 
(higher perceived elasticity because the number of competitors increases when 
trade is opened) implies that some firms are not able to cover their fixed costs. 
This is the so-called 'exit of redundant firms' effect which leads to an increase 
in the productive efficiency. On the other side increases the total number of 
firms in both markets together so that competition increases and the monopoly 
distortion decreases. This is again the 'pro-competitive' effect. 
Price discrimination as a new determinant of trade 
If market segmentation and price discrimination are possible, there can 
be trade even without economies of scale and comparative advantage (Brander 
1981, Brander and Krugman 1983). Assume two identical monopolists in two 
identical countries. They produce with constant marginal costs and take the 
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production level of the other firm as well as the distribution of this production 
between markets as given. Trade is not costless; there are transportation costs. 
If the difference between marginal costs and the foreign price level is greater 
than the transportation costs it is beneficial for the domestic monopolist to 
export its good. 
The transportation costs imply that the market share in the foreign mar-
ket will be lower than in the domestic market. This means that the domestic 
firm will face a higher elasticity of demand in the foreign market and its price 
in the foreign market will be lower than in the home market. So, one would 
expect that, if a firm would like to expand sales, additional sales at the domes-
tic market are more profitable than additional exports. However, the marginal 
price decrease of one extra unit sold has a smaller negative effect in the for-
eign market, because the number of products sold by the domestic monopolist 
in that market is lower. When a firm charges a lower price for exported goods 
than it does for the same goods sold domestically, this behaviour is called 
'dumping'. The reason why a firm may choose to dump is the difference in the 
responsiveness of sales to prices in the foreign and domestic markets. Because 
both firms are identical. Brander and Krugman talk in their model about 'recip-
rocal dumping'. The result is two-way trade in the same product (cross-hauling). 
This model gives, therefore, another explanation of intra-industry trade than 
the interaction of product differentiation and economies of scale argument. 
In this model, intra-industry trade is possible in identical products and the driv-
ing force is price discrimination. 
Implications 
1. Gains from trade appear in the form of the pro-competitive effect, the 
exit of firms which are unable to cover their fixed costs, and lower aver-
age costs if the production scale of a firm increases (if there are increasing 
returns to scale). Welfare implications are ambiguous. As can be identi-
f ied wi th the Brander/Krugman model, there are two effects. First, the 
pro-competitive effect, imports from the foreign monopolist imply that 
the total supply in the domestic market increases which lowers the do-
mestic price level. Second, some imports replace domestic deliverancies 
which leads to welfare loss through transportation costs. The total effect 
is ambiguous. If transportation costs are low, the first effect is larger than 
the second and trade is beneficial. 
2 The most important implications of this Cournot-approach are on the 
field of trade policy (see section 3.1.3). 
3.1.3 Trade policy and imperfect competition 
The assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect markets justified 
the domination of free trade policy for almost a century. These 'new' trade 
theories question this free trade policy by introducing economies of scale and 
imperfect markets. They found that an active trade policy can be beneficial in 
the certain circumstances. However, arguments against protection remain valid 
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in other circumstances. An overview of the arguments for and against protec-
t ion under imperfect competition is given below. 
Arguments for protection 
1. In case of foreign market power, the terms of trade may improve. 
Under a variety of circumstances, a foreign firm with market power wil l 
absorb a part of the tariff by increasing its price by less than the full tariff 
(it reduces its mark-up). This argument is similar to the optimal tariff ar-
gument in the traditional trade theories (see section 2.3). However, in this 
case the 'large country' assumption is not necessarily, the only require-
ments are a firm with foreign market power wi th price discrimination. 
2. Rent shifting. 
If in an industry excessive profits are earned, such an industry should be 
desired. Under certain conditions, the use of export subsidies can also 
shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. This is the so-called 'strategic' 
trade policy (Brander and Spencer, 1983, 1985; Dixit and Kyle, 1985) 1). 
An argument that justifies export subsidies is totally in contradiction with 
the traditional theories and extremely useful for lobbyists. Therefore, this 
argument gets a lot of attention and we will treat it in a more elaborate 
way. 
The argument is linked to the Cournot model of oligopolistic behaviour 
of firms. Cournot's idea is that equilibrium (or stability) will occur when 
each firm is maximizing its profits through the choice of its own level of 
production, given the output level of its rival. If firms are on equal foot-
ing at the market place, there is no reason to expect that one firm should 
be intimidated by the threat of the other to increase output in trying to 
induce contraction of the rival. So, if a firm expands its output, the other 
f i rm might well match the increase, inducing a price war. But now sup-
pose, a f irm discovers to produce more efficiently and is able to reduce 
its costs of producing additional output. Than the firm will expand its 
output and the rival will contract because it has no reason to believe the 
increased competitiveness is only temporary. The new equilibrium wil l 
involve a higher market share and output for the firm with lower costs 
and a smaller market share and output for the other f irm. 
Brander and Spencer make the point that for a firm an export subsidy (or 
production subsidy) has the same effect as lowered costs. A subsidy makes 
it in the firm's interest to expand output, it is a credible threat to the 
rival's position, who can best respond by contracting its output, and in 
effect the subsidy induces the subsidized firm to stake out a larger share 
of the international market. The firm's profits will increase, but it is also 
beneficial for the nation as the benefits exceeds the cost to taxpayers: 
1) Strategic because it is not profitable viewed in isolation but it alters competition 
in the future. For example a firm invests in excess capacity that it does not use 
but which deters potential competitors. 
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first, there is the cost saving effect of the subsidy, which is equal to the 
transfer from government budget, and second, there is the contraction 
by the rival which in itself raises the domestic firm's profits by an addi-
tional amount. 
Strategic export subsidies which improve the welfare of a country are 
very dependent on the specific assumptions of the model. Various trade 
theorists show that the argument is not true: 1) if the Cournot assump-
tion is replaced by the Bertrand assumption (Eaton and Grossman, 1986), 
2) if retaliation of foreign government occurs (Dixit and Kyle, 1985), 3) as 
other sectors will be adversely affected ('general equilibrium'-argument), 
so government needs very detailed information (Dixit and Grossman, 
1986), 4) when entry eliminates supernormal profits and then subsidies 
will only worsen terms of trade in the long run (Horstmann and Mar-
kusen, 1986). Therefore, the strategic trade argument seems to make a 
case for protection, however, so much information is needed that it is 
unlikely that this amount of information is available by the government. 
Reducing marginal cost. 
Krugman (1984) showed another beneficial trade policy in a variant of 
the Brander-Krugman model with declining marginal cost instead of con-
stant marginal cost. Assume a country which protects its domestic market 
wi th a tariff. The immediate result is that the foreign firm sells less and 
the domestic firm sells more in the domestic market. The marginal cost 
of the domestic firm declines and the marginal cost of the foreign firm 
increases. The indirect effect is that the domestic firm sells more in the 
unprotected foreign market. Krugman calls this 'import protection as 
export promotion'. If there is no retaliation, this protection policy could 
be worthwhile. Declining marginal costs are not very common, but Krug-
man shows that this analysis is also usable when time is made explicit and 
one considers dynamic economies of scale, arising for example from R&D 
or learning effects (see also 'new' growth theories). 
Prompting entry: a tariff can lower the domestic price. 
Venables (1985) shows that a small tariff can raise welfare by inducing 
entry. He assumes free entry in the Brander/Krugman model in which 
there are constant marginal costs with fixed costs. A tariff raises profit-
ability in the home market and reduces profitability in the foreign mar-
ket, which leads to entry in the home market (reduces degree of market 
power) and exit in the foreign market. There are two effects on the home 
market. On the one hand, the increased competition in the home leads 
to a lower price and on the other hand the tariff raises this price. For a 
small tariff, the first effect dominates the second effect so that the do-
mestic price level actually declines. Welfare increases because consumers 
gain (lower price level) and there are additional tariff revenues. 
External effects. 
The 'New' trade theories have broadened the basis of this argument by 
emphasizing the positive external effects of R&D activities in connection 
wi th imperfect markets (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Positive external 
effects appear especially by R&D activities because these have positive 
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spillover effects on other industries and because individual firms cannot 
internalise all the benefits of its own R&D activities. The investments in 
knowledge development are characterised by a constant cost component 
(These markets are therefore imperfect which is caused by economies of 
scale). When the scale of production increases the cost of these invest-
ments per unit of product decline (Krugman, 1987). Investments in knowl-
edge development are the source of positive spillover effects and the 
contribution of the 'New' trade theories is that these effects can now be 
explicitly modelled. Another contribution is that industries wi th external 
effects can be identified, because these theories suggests that positive 
external effects especially can be found in industries where R&D cost are 
a substantial part of total cost. 
Arguments against protection 
1. Market power. 
Normally, protection reduces competition in the domestic market and 
increases the market power of domestic firms. 
- domestic monopoly faces competitive foreign suppliers (Bhagwati, 
1965). 
Indeed, protection raises the market power of domestic firms and leads 
to a higher domestic price level. Interesting is also that the equivalence 
of import tariffs and quota's disappears in this case. In case of a tariff, 
a monopolist cannot raise its price above the tariff-inclusive import 
price otherwise it wil l loose the total domestic market. In case of a 
quota, it can use its domestic market power because the amount of 
imports are limited. Therefore, a quota will lead to a higher domestic 
price and lower domestic output than a tariff. 
- domestic monopoly faces foreign monopolist: non-cooperative beha-
viour (Krishna, 1984). 
In case of a quota and Bertrand competition, the domestic firm has two 
options. On the one hand, it can be aggressive and charge a low price 
that limits imports to less than the quota or it can be timid and charg-
ing a high price behind the protection wall of the quota. The higher 
the price level of the foreign firm the more aggressive the domestic 
firm will be. Normally, the profits of the domestic firms rise and those 
of the foreign firm decline, although a quota can also raise profits of 
both firms. 
- domestic monopoly faces foreign monopolist: collusion or cooperative 
behaviour (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1984). 
Collusion can reverse the intuitive implications of the Bhagwati-model, 
because in this case protection can increase competition and lead to 
lower prices than in the case of free trade because the penalty for 
cheating on a collusive agreement is reduced. 
2. Inefficient Entry. 
Normally, protection raises the sale of domestic firms which, in the case 
of increasing returns to scale, lowers average costs and increases effi-
ciency. However, what happens if entry is possible? 
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- Excessive entry: increasing returns to scale and cooperative behaviour 
(Eastman and Stykolt 1960). Protection in a collusive industry will lead 
to higher prices and higher profits. The long run result will be that new 
firms will enter these markets, which decreases the scale of production 
and therefore increases average costs. Therefore, protection creates 
many small inefficient firms. 
- Excessive entry: increasing returns to scale, non-cooperative behaviour 
(Dixit and Norman, 1980). Trade increases the size of the market which 
with Cournot competition implies higher sales per firm and lower aver-
age costs (the number of firms in the world declines). Protection frag-
ments markets and leads to higher production costs (in comparison 
with free trade equilibrium the number of firms increases). 
The theories based on economies of scale and imperfect competition ex-
tend the arguments for trade policy. Rent shifting is a new argument. The 
range of possibilities to improve the terms of trade is increased because even 
small countries can improve their terms of trade. Market distortions are inher-
ent in imperfect competition so for example the wedge between price and 
marginal costs creates an opportunity for government action, if consumers buy 
to few domestic products. However, trade policy is only a second best policy in 
this situation and industrial policy that eliminates the distortion is the first best 
policy. 
The question is whether these theories give a systematic new reason for 
trade policy. The answer appears to be no because the new arguments, such 
as for example the strategic trade policy (rent shifting) are very dependent on 
specific assumptions. A slight change in one of the assumptions changes or 
even reverses the implications of a policy. Good policy requires that the govern-
ment has a lot of information to choose the right model. However, this infor-
mation must be so detailed that it is not available. The empirics also show that 
the benefits from deviations from free trade are small and that the value of an 
optimal tariff is low (see section 3.1.4). The potential for making policy errors 
through lack of information or the possibility of retaliation by foreign govern-
ments makes the possible losses greater than the benefits. Therefore, Krugman 
(1987) concludes that free trade is almost never optimal under imperfect com-
petition but that it is a good rule of thumb. Feenstra (1995) confirms this con-
clusion: according to his analysis of methods used to estimate the impact of 
trade policies under imperfect competition, empirical results lend no support 
to a strategic role for trade policy. 
3.1.4 Empirics of trade theories related to economies of scale and imperfect 
competition 
The empirical study of Grubel and Lloyd (1975) was the first impressive 
work focusing on the importance of intra-industry trade. The authors did not 
test a formalized theoretical model, but pointed at the pattern of trade be-
tween countries with similar factor endowments. As such, the Grubel and Lloyd 
study can be considered to be evidence against the H-0 theorem. Together 
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wi th the work of Leontief, the study stimulated thinking of new ways to ex-
plain international trade, focusing on increasing economies of scale and imper-
fect competition. Only since the late 1970s new models of monopolistic compe-
tit ion were seen to allow a theory of trade in the presence of increasing returns 
to trade. But although there are now many theoretical models, especially in the 
intra-industry framework, sofar there have been very few empirical studies 
done to test them. Some of those are referred to by Krugman (1990: 257-261) 
and Learner (1994) and are briefly discussed here. 
The proposition that the proportion of intra-industry trade as opposed 
to inter-industry trade should be positively correlated with the degree of simi-
larity between countries' capital-labour ratios is confirmed by empirical studies 
of Loertscher and Wolter (1980) and two by Helpman (1985 and 1987). The first 
authors use differences in per capita income as a proxy for differences in re-
source endowments and confirm the correlation using a cross section regression 
for a single year. Helpman's analysis of 1985 confirms the proposition over a 
number of years and also shows that as the industrial countries become more 
similar over time the relative importance of intra-industry trade grows, just as 
the model would suggest. In his 1987 study, Helpman finds that for a group of 
14 of the most industrialized countries both GNP similarity and trade intensity 
have increased more or less constantly from 1956 to 1981, giving the appear-
ance that the model is supported. A third study, by Havryslynshyn and Civan 
(1984), gives evidence for the implication of the theory that intra-industry trade 
is likely to be more prevalent between advanced countries than between LDCs 
under the assumption that advanced countries produce more differentiated 
products. Learner (1994) criticizes the empirical studies of Loertscher and Wol-
ter and of Helpman, 1987, however, by questioning the theoretical base of the 
work. According to Learner, the link of the empirical studies and the theory is 
very fuzzy, creating difficulties in interpreting the results of the regressions 
computed. Empirical studies like these may suggest a positive relation between 
intra-industry trade and GDP level and similarity, they leave the question on 
the role of economies of scale in international relationship unresolved (Learner, 
1994:84-89). 
There are some empirical studies done attempting to quantify models by 
calibrating them to data from actual industries. Examples are Dixit's (1988) 
model of the US automobile industry, Baldwin-Krugman's (1990) model of the 
semiconductor industry, focusing on the US an Japanese market, and Venables 
and Smith (1986) studying the UK refrigerator and footwear industries. The 
results of these studies all indicate that modest tariffs are welfare improving, 
and protection has strong export-promoting effects. The work of Dixit and of 
Baldwin and Krugman are a bit more discussed below. 
In Dixit's empirical work on the US automobile industry, the US auto mar-
ket is represented as a noncooperative oligopoly of a Cournot-type (conjectural 
variations approach), with foreign cars differentiated from domestic. After cali-
brating his model with data from the industry. Dixit examines the effect of 
policy variables like tariffs on foreign rivals and a production subsidy to domes-
tic producers. A modest tariff on imports appears to be beneficial to US indus-
try for reasons of access to home market and scale economies. However, these 
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gains are shown to be small. If a production subsidy is granted, the additional 
role for a tariff is greatly reduced, wi th the gains from adding tariffs as an in-
strument extremely small. 
Baldwin and Krugman elaborated a model on the semiconductor indus-
try. Semiconductor manufacture is an extraordinary dynamic industry, where 
technological changes happen very rapidly. This technological change is largely 
endogenous, the result of R&D and learning by doing. Until the late 1970s, US 
firms had dominated the market of semiconductors but than Japanese firms 
took over. Baldwin and Krugman developed a simulation model, of which pa-
rameters are partly drawn from other published studies and partly estimated 
by calibrating the model to actual data. As in Dixit's study, the authors adopt 
a conjectural variations approach in order to match the observed industry struc-
ture. Krugman and Baldwin provide an assessment of the importance of mar-
ket access by focusing on the impact of Japanese policy to protect domestic 
markets for their own semiconductor industry on the ability to sell not only in 
the domestic market but also in world markets. The analysis suggests that privi-
leged access to the domestic market was decisive in giving Japanese firms the 
ability to compete in the world market. However, these protection policies 
resulted in higher Japanese prices, hurting consumers without generating com-
pensating producer gain, so in welfare terms the policy impact has been nega-
tive. 
Harris and Cox (1984) developed a general equilibrium model for Canada 
with increasing returns and imperfect (monopolistic) competition build in and 
adopt the assumption that firms are able to cooperate well enough to raise the 
domestic price to the foreign price plus tariff (Eastman-Stykolt pricing assump-
tion). The excess profits in the protected (import-competing) industries lead to 
entry of new firms and result in an inefficiently small scale industry structure. 
Furthermore, the authors show that the inefficient scale in the Canadian export 
industries is due to US protection policies. Combining these effects, the authors 
f ind that the costs to Canada from its partial isolation from the US market are 
several times higher than those estimated by conventional CG E models. Their 
conclusion is that free trade between the US and Canada would be beneficial 
to both. 
3.2 Neo-technology trade theories 
The common feature of technology-oriented theories of trade is an em-
phasis on technological change and the resulting patterns of trade. In these 
theories trade patterns are explained in terms of technological progress. Tech-
nological differences or gaps across countries are an endogenous outcome 
through firm level product and process innovation that reduces costs of produc-
tion and generates new or better products. The flow of technological develop-
ments and innovation is assumed to be not free and instantaneous, which im-
plies that a firm/country has at least a temporary comparative advantage in 
production and exports. The major early contributions of this field are done by 
Kravis (1956), Posner (1961), and Vernon (1966). 
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Please note the difference with the Ricardian trade models in which dif-
ferences in technology (productivity) for some given goods cause trade. In the 
Neo-technology trade models trade is caused by the simple fact that the inno-
vating country generates some new products that other countries, at least tem-
porary, are unable to produce. 
According to Kravis (1956), international trade is caused by differences in 
the availability of certain products among countries. When unavailability at 
home is due to lack of natural resources, the comparative advantage explana-
tion would be perfectly adequate, but Kravis's analysis points at differences in 
availability arising out of technological and product innovation. Technological 
progress causes comparative advantage in trade by reducing costs of produc-
t ion or by supplying new products. 
Posner (1961) sketches what may be called a technology gap model. Pos-
ner observed that as new products and processes are continually being devel-
oped, the country in which these innovations occur will temporarily enjoy the 
technological advantage over its trading partners in these particular products. 
This advantage wil l last only until the new technology is imitated in other 
countries. But before that happens, the innovating country may export the 
good even though it has no obvious basis for comparative advantage in terms 
of factor intensities and endowments. Overtime, each innovation is eventually 
diffused around the world and the initial advantage is lost. However, as prog-
ress continues, new discoveries are constantly being made and there exists a 
constantly changing list of new products in which the innovating country en-
joys a comparative advantage. 
Vernon (1966) analyses shifts in international trade in constructing a 
'product-cycle' hypothesis. He also invokes the role of foreign direct investment 
by (multinational) firms in international trade. Vernon argues that the develop-
ers of new products must stay in close proximity to their markets, so as to bene-
f i t from customer feedback in modifying the product and also to provide ser-
vice. In addition, he argues that discovery of the innovation itself is helped by 
the proximity to those whose needs the innovation will satisfy. Thus, both inno-
vation and production tend to be concentrated in countries where new needs 
and wants are first making themselves known. Vernon explicitly rejects not only 
factor proportions but also comparative costs as determining the location of 
production - and later export - of new products. Instead, he predicts that new 
products will be first produced in, and later exported from, the country where 
they are first demanded. Only later still, when the product matures and be-
comes standardized, does its production move to a location of lower cost. Ac-
cording to Vernon's characterization, the product cycle might last from five to 
twenty years. 
Unlike Vernon, Hirsch (1967) goes back to the concept factor proportions 
in dealing with a 'product cycle' hypothesis. He argues that new products go 
through a cycle of systemic changes in technology. New products at first re-
quire large amounts of skilled labour in their production and development. As 
larger quantities are demanded, however, more capital intensive production 
techniques become appropriate. Finally, when products mature and become 
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standardized, the production process becomes routine, and less skilled labour 
can play a greater and greater role. Hirsch goes on to explain the location of 
production by essentially applying the multi-factor H-0 theorem to this pattern 
of factor intensities among new, growing, and mature products. 
The first comprehensive formalisation of these attempts to try to explain 
trade in terms of technology was offered by Krugman (1979a) in his North-
South-model. We will use this elementary model to represent the technology 
gap models. 
Basic assumptions 
Production factors: only labour. This factor is domestically mobile and in-
ternationally immobile; 
Goods: n-different commodities (differentiated products); 
Technology: the North can only produce innovative goods (new product variet-
ies), identical production functions (labour productivity) between North and 
South for imitative goods; 
Economies of scale: constant returns to scale; 
Market structure: monopolistic competition; 
Consumer preferences: homogeneous and identical between countries, con-
sumers possess 'love of variety' (Dixit-Stiglitz utility function). 
Main mechanism 
The North innovates and introduces a continuous exogenous stream of 
new product varieties on the market. Only after a time-lag the non-innovative 
South imitates these new products. Because consumers in both regions display 
'love of variety' they will demand all product varieties. The North will therefore 
export new products and imports imitated products and the opposite is true for 
the South. The innovation and imitation rate will therefore determine the pat-
tern of trade and the time-lag in the adoption of new technologies is the fac-
tor that gives rise to trade. 
Implications 
No fixed pattern of trade: each good is first exported by the innovative 
North and after a time lag it will be exported by the South (Vernon's 
product live cycle). 
Wages in the North are higher: The labour productivity in both countries 
is the same, however, for the new product varieties the North obtains 
monopoly power and the associated rents f low to the only factor of pro-
duction, labour. The wages will therefore be higher in the North than in 
the South. Because the labour productivity for imitated goods is assumed 
equal in both regions, only the South will produce imitated products. 
An imitation of a new product by the South (technology transfer) moves 
production from the North to the South. At initial prices this reduces pro-
duction costs and increases world output which causes allocative gains for 
both countries. However, imitation also alters world distribution of in-
come because the wages in the North will decline and those in the South 
will rise. The decline in the wage differential improves the terms of trade 
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for the South. The terms of trade effect is therefore a secondary positive 
effect for the South but a negative effect for the North. So, imitation is 
beneficial for the South and the North may be worse off. 
An innovation in the North raises the number of product varieties and 
because consumers display love of variety, this is beneficial for both the 
South and the North. Production and capturing the rents takes place in 
the North, so their wages increase and the terms of trade improves for 
the North (a secondary benefit for the North and a loss for the South, 
however in the Krugman model this secondary effect is always smaller 
than the love of variety effect). 
The implication that innovation improves the terms of trade is in contra-
diction with the traditional theories in which technological change in the 
export sector generally worsens the terms of trade. 
Income in the North depends partly on the rents from their monopoly of 
newly produced products. Implications of the imitation and innovation 
process imply that the North must continuously innovate in order to pre-
serve its wages or, to put it in Krugman's words, 'Like Alice and the Red 
Queen, the developed region must keep running to stay in the same 
place'. 
World output will raise both by innovation and imitation. 
An increase in labour in one region makes this region worse off because 
real wages decline and the terms of trade deteriorates. 
International movement of production factors: a two-factor version of 
the standard model, in which labour is immobile between countries and 
capital is mobile internationally has some interesting implications. Inno-
vation in the North will be associated with capital inflows because it 
raises the marginal product of capital in this region. The inflow of capital 
is an additional (next to the effects that appeared in the one factor 
model) benefit for Northern wages and the outflow of capital is an addi-
tional negative effect that hurts wages in the South. Through this effect 
Southern workers can even loose from innovation. The profits from inno-
vation are collected by the immobile factors: while the incomes of mobile 
factors will be equalized the inequality of incomes of immobile factors 
increases. The effects of imitation are just opposite and induce a capital 
inflow in the South. 
Dollar (1986) combines this North-South-model with the H-O-S model. In 
this model, the rate of imitation is positively affected by the North-South 
wage differential. Jensen and Thursby (1987) assume endogenous innova-
tion by a Northern monopolist (innovation depends on resources devoted 
to R&D). One result that differs from the Krugman model is that imitation 
may improve the terms of trade for the North. Segerstrom, Anant and 
Dinoupulos (1990) developed a model in which R&D is both costly and 
risky (an innovation race that a firm may win or lose). 
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Policy 
Free trade policy is beneficial from a world point of view: 
- the decline of industries in developed countries will be a recurrent 
event and from a point of view of world efficiency it is desirable. How-
ever, some countries may loose from trade therefore it is essential that 
there will be some income redistribution effects. 
Imitation from a nationalistic point of view 
From a Northern point of view: 
- imitation has two effects, on the one side it erodes Northern profits 
but on the other side it increases world output. The total effect on 
Northern income is ambiguous. If Northern countries loose they can 
react in two manners. First, they introduce 'innovation policy' that may 
increase the innovation rate and so upset the negative effects of imita-
t ion, and whether this is impossible or the effects are too small they 
can use trade policy to protect their markets. The latter implies losses 
from a world point of view, but Northern countries will only choose for 
free trade if there is a correct international technology transfer system. 
From a Southern point of view: 
- imitation has not only allocative gains but it also improves its terms of 
trade. Policies that increase the rate of imitation are beneficial for the 
South. However, there must be a correct technology transfer system 
otherwise it encourages protection by the North that makes them even 
worse off. 
Innovation from a nationalistic point of view 
From Northern point of view: 
- innovation policy that increases innovation rate is beneficial. 
From a Southern point of view: 
- innovation in the North may hurt the South when it induces a capital 
outf low in the South. Protectionism may be worthwhile in this case. 
Critical remarks 
- innovation and imitation are costless and exogenous; 
- innovation is only possible by introducing new varieties (product inno-
vation), process-oriented innovations are not possible; 
- the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods is constant. This 
assumption is questionable with regard to new and imitated goods. 
Empirics 
Most, if not all empirical tests of the technology trade theories try to ex-
plain the pattern of trade of the US, simply assuming that the US is the innova-
tive Northern country with high capita incomes and relative wages and the rest 
of the world the imitating South. According to Dearndorff (1984) the tests of 
these theories using US data have tended to be rather successful. Several au-
thors sought and found positive correlations between US export performance 
across industries and various measures of R&D. Since R&D is related to techno-
logical progress, whatever its cause or effects, this evidence lends support to all 
technology theories of trade. The technology theories point at different rea-
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sons for their prediction that the North (the US) will be an exporter of new 
products. Dearndorff, however, identifies several studies that support both the 
technology gap and the product cycle explanations of US trade (Dearndorff, 
1984:495-499). These studies focus on the correlation of US trade performance 
and various technology-related variables, suggested by the technology theories 
of trade. In all studies, research and development as an important determinant 
of US exports appears to f ind strong support. 
Several tests of the technology theory of trade have also introduced addi-
tional explanatory variables, including those that are appropriate to the factor 
proportions theory, and support too the conclusion there is a strong and posi-
tive correlations between trade performance and technology-related variables. 
At the same time, however, it becomes clear that technology-related variables 
are much related to the ability of individuals, firms, countries to develop and 
exploit technology which is related to the availability of knowledge and skills. 
Dearndorff concludes therefore that it is difficult to distinguish evidence sup-
porting technology from evidence supporting human capital or skills as deter-
minants of trade (1984: 499). 
Dosi et al., 1990 is a recent study which shows that countries tend to be 
strong exporters in industries in which they invest heavily in R&D. The process 
of creating comparative advantage could be described by the product cycle but 
although some empirical studies provided evidence for some industries, recent 
work suggests that this explanation is not very far-reaching. Gagnon and Rose 
(1992) analyse US and Japanese trade statistics between 1962 and 1988 and 
show that both countries' trade patterns at the 4-digit level remained remark-
ably stable: very few goods moved from exports to imports or vice versa. Al-
though this result need not be inconsistent with the product cycle theory, 
Krugman (1995:354) states that the results of this study indicates that there is 
no evidence for a rapidly and constantly changing industrial structure of each 
nation, or at least 'operates much more slowly than the rethoric of product 
cycle enthusiasts would suggest'. By the end of the 1970s Vernon (1979) himself 
already questioned some elements of his own 'production cycle' explanation 
of trade. He questioned whether production of new products has to start near 
their markets, mainly because he observed that wages and incomes have 
caught up to the US in several other countries. Furthermore, Vernon argued 
that the growth and spread of multinationals have undermined the product 
cycle theory. Technological levels among advanced countries showed to con-
verge rapidly and, especially because of multinationals, the speed of diffusion 
of innovations accelerated. 
To conclude, empirical tests or application of the product cycle theory are 
limited in extent. The support from these studies for the idea of the 'technol-
ogy gap' as driving force behind trade is fragmentary at the best, suggesting 
evidence for the idea that transitory advantage resulting from innovation is a 
major factor in trade for only some industries. 
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4. TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW 
GROWTH THEORIES 
4.1 New Growth theories 
Growth-accounting studies show that technical change is the most impor-
tant factor contributing to economic growth (e.g. Solow, 1957, Denison, 1962). 
However, the standard Neo-classical growth model treated this important fac-
tor as exogenous to the system. Hence, the need has arisen to make technology 
endogenous. The 'new' growth theories found several ways to endogenize 
technological change in a general equilibrium model 1). There are two main 
approaches to model endogenous growth and both built forward on the 'new' 
trade theories. 
The first approach assumes that externalities or learning-by-doing effects, 
which are by-products of other activities, cause growth and the 'external econ-
omies of scale approach' is used to model these effects (see section 3.1.1, within 
the 'new' trade theories). The second approach assumes that technological 
change is the intentional outcome of economic behaviour and firms have to 
'invest' in knowledge creation to obtain technological change. Resources have 
to be invested in activities that are not directly productive. The 'internal econo-
mies of scale approach' within the new trade theories showed a direction to 
model this process (see section 3.1.2). Investments in knowledge can be seen 
as a kind of fixed costs and monopolistic competition makes it possible to cover 
these fixed costs. Most studies that use the second approach, assume also that 
knowledge generates some externalities and are therefore a mixture of both 
approaches. Because this has become the dominating approach we discuss the 
first approach and a mixture of both approaches. 
The reason to include the 'new' growth theories in this overview is that 
the 'new' growth theories put the static trade models into a dynamic setting. 
It is important that these theories deal therefore with the dynamic evolution 
of comparative advantage and the consequences of trade in a world of global 
technological competition (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). In this survey we 
focus on the dynamic trade implications of these 'new' growth theories. 
4.1.1 Knowledge as side-product: external economies of scale 
The central mechanism in this 'knowledge as side-product' approach con-
sists of three elements. The first element is that a firm creates knowledge as a 
side product to normal business activities, such as producing goods or doing 
1) For an overview of the 'new' growth theories, see Verspagen (1990), Van de 
Klundert en Smulders (1991), Schneider and Ziesemer (1995) or Van Meijl (1995, 
chapter 2). 
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investments. Learning-by-doing is an important theoretical explanation for 
these externalities. According to Arrow (1962) the acquisition of knowledge 
(learning) is positively related to experience. He argues that a good measure 
of experience is investment because 'each new machine produced and put into 
use is capable of changing the environment in which production takes place, 
so that learning takes place with continuous new stimuli' (Arrow, 1962, p.157). 
The second important element in this approach is that newly created 
knowledge by one firm flows directly to all other firms where it can be used 
without payments in return: knowledge spillover effects exist. The third impor-
tant element is that the newly created knowledge increases the productivity 
level of the production factor that can be accumulated (e.g. capital). 
To understand the role of the three elements in the growth mechanism 
it is illustrative to describe the standard Neoclassical growth model where 
growth vanishes without an assumption of external technological progress. In 
this standard model it is assumed that there are diminishing returns to the pro-
duction factor that can be accumulated: i.e. when you add more and more 
capital to a piece of land the marginal benefits are diminishing. Therefore, 
incentives to invest in capital in this model vanish and growth will end. In the 
'Knowledge as side-product approach' growth may not vanish because linked 
to the accumulation of capital new knowledge will be created and this knowl-
edge makes capital more productive in all firms. The knowledge spillovers may 
exactly counterbalance the diminishing returns of the factor that can be accu-
mulated by increasing its productivity level. As a consequence the incentive to 
invest in the factor that can be accumulated may not diminish and this may 
result in a positive growth rate. 
In modelling terms, this approach has used the methodology of the 'ex-
ternal economies of scale' approach to achieve endogenous growth (see sec-
t ion 3.1.1, within the 'new' trade theories). More specifically, firms invest in 
new equipment which also generates some knowledge that increases the 
productivity of the capital stock of the investing firm but also of the other firms 
(i.e. a spillover effect). The latter effect is not taken into account by the invest-
ing firm and therefore increasing returns are wholly external to the firm which 
allows perfect competition to remain at the firm level. However, the existence 
of externalities causes increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production 
function. This implies that if one firms doubles its inputs, the inputs of other 
firms will also increase, and hence this will result in a more than proportionate 
increase in aggregate production. The latter causes the economy to grow wi th 
a positive endogenous growth rate. When the positive spillover effect is large 
enough the economy will grow with a positive growth rate (Romer 1986). Be-
cause individual producers do not take into account their knowledge spillovers 
on other producers a competitive economy gets a lower growth rate than so-
cially optimal. 
This approach recognizes that knowledge has some non-rival good char-
acteristics. However, technological progress or the growth of the knowledge 
stock appears as a side product to activities that are not specifically directed to 
the creation of knowledge. 
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Dynamic trade implications 
The trade implications of these 'new' growth models are illustrated wi th 
the Lucas-ll model (1988) in which initial factor endowments determine the 
pattern of specialization and the Young (1991) model in which there is a con-
t inuum of goods and the specialization pattern is determined by the initial 
technological capabilities (i.e knowledge stock). 
Initial factor endowments govern trade patterns: the Lucas II model 
Lucas (1988) describes in the second part of his paper a model in which 
all human capital accumulation is learning by doing (no resources have to be 
invested to increase the human capital level). Technology is assumed identical 
across countries and there exists endogenous technological change by increas-
ing the efficiency (process-oriented) via unbounded learning by doing effects 
that are good-specific. Lucas identifies a high technology good in which learn-
ing is faster than in the other good. Furthermore, there are two kinds of hu-
man capital which are specific for the production of one of the goods. In this 
model the trade pattern is determined by differences in the countries initial 
relative human capital endowments. Because all human capital accumulation 
is learning by doing, countries accumulate skills in goods in which they have 
already a comparative advantage, and reinforce in this manner their initial 
comparative advantage. 
The intertemporal welfare effects that determine the desirability of a cer-
tain specialization pattern are dependent on two effects. First, learning effects 
are highest in the high technology good which leads to a faster growth in pro-
duction of this good. However, secondly, this faster production growth implies 
that the terms of trade will move against it. The deterioration in the terms of 
trade is dependent on the degree of substitutability between the two goods: 
if the degree of substitutability is low (high) the terms of trade declines strong-
ly (less). This implies that the country which specializes in the high tech good 
gets the highest real growth rate only if the substitution elasticity between the 
two goods is elastic. An important result of this model is that real growth rates 
are determined endogenously and they can differ across countries. 
Initial technological capabilities govern trade patterns: the Young model 
Young (1991) investigates the dynamic effects of international trade in 
a world consisting of a less developed country (LDC) and a developed country 
(DC), the latter distinguished by a higher initial level of knowledge. There exists 
a continuum of technical more sophisticated goods (to produce more advanced 
goods, more experience/knowledge is needed). Technological change is caused 
by learning by doing effects that are bounded in each good (per unit output 
labour requirements decline until a certain boundary is met when production 
increases). At each point in time there are two sets of goods, one in which the 
learning by doing effect has stopped and one in which learning by doing con-
tinues. In a static sense this is comparable to the Lucas model, however in a 
dynamic sense it differs because it endogenizes the movement of goods out of 
the learning by doing (infant industry) sector into the other (mature) sector. 
Old goods wil l be discarded for more advanced goods and this causes an in-
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crease in the labour productivity. Over time, growth causes the production of 
a changing basket of goods, with both the quantity and variety of goods con-
sumed increasing (there wil l be gains from increasing variety wi thout the as-
sumption of monopolistic competition). The trade pattern will not become 
static but remains evolving. With trade the LDC (DC) specializes in the mature 
(infant industry) goods where learning by doing has (not) ended. The LDC (DC) 
experiences a less than or equal (greater than or equal) rate of technical prog-
ress and GDP growth to these under autarky. If the DC population is greater 
than or equal to that of the LDC or when the initial technical gap is large, the 
technical gap between these countries will grow without bound. Only when 
the initial technical gap is not too large and the LDC is larger there is a possibil-
ity of catching up or leapfrogging. 
Finally, wi th regard to intertemporal welfare effects the results of this 
Young model are ambiguous and depend for example on the initial technology 
gap and on the size of the countries. If the DC maintains its technical lead, DC 
consumers gain from trade by dynamic (higher rate of technical progress) and 
the usual static gains from trade. Although its own rate of technical progress 
decreases the welfare of LDC consumers may still improve through the usual 
static gains from trade, which increases as the DC experiences technological 
progress. In general it can be said that the welfare of the LDC will improve 
when it is small relative to the DC, it wil l be reduced when the LDC is much 
larger than the DC and it cannot catch up. If the LDC catches up its welfare may 
increase or decrease (the latter is possible when the terms of trade deteriorates 
relatively fast for more sophisticated products). 
Main trade mechanism 
In principle the specialization and trade pattern is determined by compar-
ative advantage (Lucas; initial factor endowments) or the initial knowledge 
stock (Young; technological capabilities and country size). The dynamic implica-
tions of these external economies of scale growth theories are that in general 
a country will built up knowledge or expertise in the goods in which it special-
izes and therefore reinforces its comparative advantage in these goods, al-
though the possibility of leapfrogging and reversing comparative advantage 
remains (see, Young model). Because the technological opportunities differ 
between goods the specialization pattern determines also the welfare level 
and long term growth of a country. 
Po//cy 
Industrial policy to correct for positive externalities (learning effects or 
knowledge spillover effects). 
In the Lucas and Young models learning effects are assumed to be exter-
nal, agents do not take them into account. If they did they would allocate 
labour more to the good with the high growth potential in exchange for 
a less desirable mix of current consumption. An industrial policy focused 
on 'picking winners' (subsidizing the production of goods with a high 
learning potential) is the right policy. However, Lucas remarks 'In the 
model, 'picking winners' is easy. If only it were so in reality! (1988:31)'. 
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Industrial or trade policy (second best) to reverse the specialization pat-
tern: 
industrial or trade policy (second best) can also be used to obtain the 
specialization pattern that leads to the most desirable specialization pat-
tern in the long run. Subsidies or protection can reverse the specialization 
pattern. However, to deduce the correct policy advice in this model is very 
difficult because one has to know the exact technological opportunities 
of different goods in different countries. 
4.1.2 Knowledge as investment: a combination of external and internal 
economies of scale with monopolistic competition 
An obvious drawback of the external economies of scale approach is that 
technological progress is a side-product of other activities. In the knowledge 
as investment approach technological progress becomes the intentional out-
come of economic behaviour. The general method chosen in this approach is 
to identify a separate R&D sectors along other sectors in the economy. The R&D 
sector produces blueprints of new goods and as a side-product general techno-
logical knowledge. The blueprints are specific and provide guidelines to pro-
duce a certain 'unique' product. The R&D sector sells these blueprints to the 
production sector. The production sector can sell these unique products above 
marginal costs (i.e. imperfect competition) and can earn back the fixed costs of 
buying the blue-print. The general technological knowledge cannot be applied 
in the production of goods, but has a more general nature. It adds to a general 
knowledge pool which can be used in the production of blue-prints. A larger 
general knowledge pool, in turn, reduces the costs of producing blueprints and 
is therefore a stimulus for the development of new blueprints by all firms in the 
research sector. This continuous incentive to develop new products causes en-
dogenous growth. Important for the generation of endogenous growth is that 
the incentive to invest in R&D does not decline. In all these kind of models the 
growing stock of knowledge as a side product of R&D generates this constant 
incentive, whether these models focus on R&D firms expanding product variety 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991b) or on increasing quality of a constant number 
of varieties (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). 
In models where R&D expands product variety it is assumed that a larger 
number of product varieties is valued positively by consumers (in case of con-
sumer products) or it increases the productivity of the final production sector 
(in case of intermediate products). When an individual f irm determines the 
amount of R&D to invest, it does not take into account that the knowledge it 
will produce also increases the knowledge level of other firms because it does 
not get compensation for this. If the innovator would get compensated by the 
other firms for this increase in knowledge it would have had invested more: 
this is called the intertemporal spillover effect which dominates in these mod-
els. A R&D subsidy can give the firms the right incentive (Grossman and Help-
man, 1991b). Therefore, the market provides just as in the external economies 
of scale approach insufficient incentives for industrial research in comparison 
wi th what is socially optimal. 
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In models where R&D enhances the quality of products, it is also assumed 
that R&D performed by a firm contributes to a general knowledge stock that 
can be used by all firms. This is again an intertemporal spillover effect which 
may lead to under-investment in R&D. However, in these increasing quality 
models, the firm that innovates gets the whole market and destroys the profits 
of the previous innovator. Because an individual f irm does not take this profit 
destruction effect into account, this may lead to over-investment in R&D in 
comparison whit what is socially optimal. Therefore, the two main market dis-
tortions are the profit destruction effect (displaced leaders lose a stream of 
monopoly profits) and the knowledge spillover effect. The incentive to invest 
in R&D can therefore be too low or too high. In this case, the optimal policy can 
be a tax or subsidy (Aghion and Howitt, 1989, Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). 
Dynamic trade implications 
Assumptions 
Usually, these theories divide the labour market in unskilled labour and 
human capital. They assume that advances in technology are most often engi-
neered by skilled people who have invested heavily in the development of their 
technical skills. Unskilled workers generally substitute quite imperfectly for 
skilled labour (Helpman and Grossman, 1991). Furthermore, it is assumed that 
relative factor endowments differ between countries and are fixed. 
A further assumption is that the various manufacturing activities differ 
both in the intensity wi th which they employ various primary inputs and in 
their potential for contributing to innovation and productivity growth. In gen-
eral these theories assume a traditional good that is unskilled labour intensive, 
a differentiated high tech good that is human capital intensive, and a R&D 
sector that produces blueprints for the differentiated high tech good that is 
even more human capital intensive. The potential for technological change is 
low for the traditional good and high for the high tech good. The traditional 
good is produced with constant returns under perfect competition and the 
high tech good is produced with increasing returns to scale in a monopolistic 
market structure. In most cases the production technology is identical across 
countries, in some cases one country has a larger knowledge stock and there-
fore a higher productivity of human capital in the R&D sector. 
The dynamic trade and welfare implications of this approach are also 
dependent on the assumption whether knowledge spillovers are national or 
international in scope. Does or does not knowledge f low across borders? The 
trade and welfare implications of this approach are illustrated wi th two back-
bone models. In the first model knowledge spillovers are international in scope 
and in the second model knowledge spillovers are national in scope. 
A. International knowledge spillovers 
Assume a two factor (human capital and unskilled labour), two sector 
(traditional goods and high-tech differentiated goods), two-country 
model. The two sectors differ in their factor intensities and in their contri-
bution to technical progress. Countries differ in their relative factor en-
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dowments. Further assume that goods must be produced in the country 
in which they have been developed. 
The human capital-abundant country (net) exports the human capital-
intensive differentiated product (Heckscher-Ohlin theorem). There are 
net-exports because there is intra-industry trade in the differentiated 
sector. Each firm in each country exports his unique developed brand. The 
relative labour-abundant country exports the traditional labour intensive 
good. So far nothing new in comparison wi th the 'new' trade theories 
(see section 2.1.2, Krugman, 1981, Dixit and Norman, 1980, Ethier, 1979). 
But these 'new' growth theories add one important prediction to the 
static models: The long run growth rates of output and GDP are linked 
to resource endowments. 
If there is imperfect specialization in the long run, the steady state rates 
of innovation in the high tech sectors of the two countries are the same, 
because both countries keep an R&D sector. However, the R&D and high-
tech sectors represent a larger fraction of value added in the human-capi-
tal rich country. The labour rich country specializes relatively in the manu-
facturing of traditional goods, where opportunities for technical progress 
are fewer. Therefore the human capital rich country experiences a faster 
growth rate of output. Despite this both countries enjoy the same growth 
of real consumption because long run interest rates are the same in both 
countries and each has access via trade to the entire set of innovative 
products. 
International knowledge spillover is a crucial feature for these results, 
because this makes that all innovators have the same knowledge and 
that national advantages in R&D arise only from differences in relative 
factor prices (which are dependent on resource endowments). Factors 
such as the size of a country and the history of its production play no role 
in the long term trade pattern, what only matters are factor endowments 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). 
National knowledge spillovers 
Consider a world wi th only one production factor (labour) and in which 
countries only differ in size and in their prior research experience. With 
only national knowledge spillovers the initial conditions govern long run 
outcomes. In many situations the country with the initially greater stock 
of knowledge has an advantage in R&D and accumulates knowledge 
more quickly than its trading partner. This sustains and adds to its pro-
ductivity lead. History alone determines long-run trade patterns and 
growth rates (i.e. hysteresis). Only when the countries are very different 
in size the large country can overcome a modest knowledge lag if the 
share of consumer spending devoted to traditional goods is relatively 
small. 
The welfare implications for a country are very dependent on the special-
ization pattern and the related wage rates. When the country that con-
ducts the world's R&D also enjoys higher wages in the long run, it is again 
possible that a country which specializes in the sector without national 
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knowledge spillovers loses from trade or can improve its welfare by spe-
cialising in the other sector. In this case R&D policy for the lagging coun-
try is justified 1). A sufficiently large subsidy to R&D can be used to over-
come the initial productivity disadvantage. The specialization pattern will 
be reversed. This is called policy-hysteresis: a temporary policy can have 
permanent effects (Grossman and Helpman, 1991b). 
Main trade mechanism 
When innovation leads to the development of new varieties of horizon-
tally differentiated firms, the pattern of trade is determined by the number of 
blueprints in the hands of each country's firms. Over time the trade pattern 
evolves in accordance with the number of new discoveries made by entrepre-
neurs in each country. This in turn depends upon the R&D investments that 
take place in each location. 
With quality competition innovators try to improve the quality of existing 
products. If they succeed, they capture the world market. The direction of trade 
in a particular product may therefore reverse over time. In aggregate the pat-
tern of trade is determined by the number of products in which a country takes 
the lead. This is again dependent on the amount of R&D investments. 
In both cases the R&D investments are dependent on the specialization 
pattern which is caused by the principle of comparative advantage (factor en-
dowments), history, the initial stock of knowledge, the scale of a country and 
the demand structure. These factors determine the number of people that are 
working in the R&D sector, the high tech sector and the low-tech sector. 
The welfare and growth implications are dependent on the specialization 
pattern and whether knowledge spillovers are national or international in 
scope. With international knowledge spillovers and no full specialization all 
countries will gain from trade and no specialization pattern is preferable. How-
ever, with national knowledge spillovers the welfare implications of certain 
specialization patterns are very different and may even be negative. In this 
situation certain specialization patterns may be preferable to others. 
Po//cy 
Industrial policy (first best) and trade policy (second best) may be benefi-
cial in the fol lowing circumstances: 
in models where R&D expands product variety there is an under invest-
ment in R&D (because intertemporal knowledge spillovers dominate). An 
R&D subsidy is the right policy; 
1) However, with equal wages an R&D subsidy often reduces welfare despite it 
increases the growth rate of the gross domestic product. The main reason is that 
trade in goods and assets produces the most efficient outcome: 'residents of the 
country that specializes in the production of traditional goods still benefit from 
innovations that are made abroad because they invest their savings in foreign 
assets and import the novel goods that emerge from their labs' (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991:232). 
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in models where R&D increases product quality there can be an under- or 
overinvestment in R&D. An R&D subsidy or tax is the right policy; 
in models where knowledge spillovers are national in scale and wages 
linked to the high tech goods are higher, a temporary protection policy 
may change the specialization and trade pattern (policy hysteresis). 
4.1.3 Empirics 
The new growth theories developed useful concepts to deal with techno-
logical change and growth. However, just as in the case of the new trade theo-
ries (imperfect competition and economies of scale), the problem with this ap-
proach is that it is difficult to test these theories empirically. It is extremely diffi-
cult to quantify certain effects and estimate their importance and therefore it 
is hard to decide whether or not it is beneficial to imply some policies. At the 
moment there seems to be no need for more complicated models but priority 
should be given to the empirical implementation of these theories. 
The empirical evidence on the assumptions and implications of the new 
growth theories has just started. Jones (1995a) has tested the relationship be-
tween changes in R&D spending and changes in macroeconomic growth im-
plied by these models. More specifically, all the models that treat knowledge 
as an investment good (R&D-based models) have assumed that past knowledge 
is never rendered obsolete by new innovation and that therefore there are 
constant returns to R&D investments, which has the following implications for 
per capita growth rates: 'if the level of resources devoted to R&D, measured, 
say by the number of scientists engaged in R&D, is doubled, then the per capita 
growth rate of output should also double, at least in the steady state.' Jones 
shows that empirically this prediction receives little support. The number of 
scientist engaged in R&D in advanced countries has grown dramatically over 
the last 40 years and growth rates either have exhibited at constant mean or 
have even declined on average. 
Furthermore, Jones (1995b) shows that if one releases the assumption of 
constant returns to scale to R&D, the influence of policy (e.g. R&D subsidies) on 
the long-run growth rate vanishes. However, how long is the long run? Policies 
can still have an influence on the period on the growth along the transition 
path to the new steady state. Whether policies are still worthwhile depends on 
the length of the transition path and the magnitude in which policies can 
shorten this path. 
Several authors investigated the assumption of whether spillovers are 
national or international in scope because in models with only national spill-
overs government policy can have long lasting effects. Coe and Helpman (1993) 
and Bernstein and Mohnen (1994) f ind some evidence for international spill-
overs. However, Branstetter (1996), who investigated both intra-national and 
international spillovers, concludes that intranational spillovers are stronger 
than international spillovers. There is also some evidence that spillovers are 
geographically localized (Jaffe 1986, Acs et al. 1992). Overall, there is evidence 
that some spillovers are international in nature, but local or intra-national 
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knowledge spillovers exist too. This gives some support to models in which 
government policy may have long lasting effects. 
4.2 Evolutionary Growth Theories 
A recent direction within economics assumes that technology plays the 
fundamental role in economic life. In contradiction to the 'new' trade and 
'new' growth theories they see the process of technical change as a dynamic 
evolutionair process. The innovation process is characterised by cumulative, 
firm-specific and irreversible processes (Dosi et all., 1988). Therefore, technol-
ogy cannot be reduced to freely available information or to a set of 'blue-
prints'. Furthermore, they assume out of equilibrium dynamics and bounded 
rational behaviour. These 'technology' theories are therefore a radical depart-
ment from the traditional trade models which took technology data as exoge-
nous to the economic process. However, because the evolutionary growth the-
ories reject many of the standard neoclassical assumptions they are less formal 
and more heterogeneous. Because of this heterogeneous nature we concen-
trate on some central features of the evolutionary economics. 
Assumptions 
Important assumptions in the evolutionary growth theory are that the 
innovation process is characterised by cumulative, firm-specific and irreversible 
processes; sectors differ in their contribution to the absolute competitiveness 
of a country; and countries differ in technology skills and innovation capacity. 
From innovation process to technology trade mode 
The development of technology is cumulative and firm specific. Techno-
logical changes are often caused by learning by doing and learning by using, 
such that technology is often firm or region specific, and is generally embodied 
in people and organisations (Dosi, 1988, Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 1990). This as-
sumption of firm specific knowledge is in contrast with the new growth theo-
ries which assume that knowledge directly flows to a general knowledge stock 
which can be used by all firms (national and international). 
Technological paradigms (Dosi, 1988) and technological trajectories (Nel-
son and Winter, 1977) send resources in a certain direction and take care of the 
fact that technical progress happens along a relatively ordered, cumulative and 
irreversible pattern. The technological opportunities of a firm are, therefore, 
constrained by activities in the past. By searching for innovations it wil l build 
further on and is restricted by his 'specific' knowledge. 
Besides these private, firm-specific aspects of knowledge, some public 
good features of knowledge play a role in the process of technical change. 
First, the freely available information, such as publications. A second public 
good feature is related to the 'untraded interdependencies' between sectors, 
firms and technologies. These interdependencies appear in the form of techno-
logical complementarities, synergy effects, spillover effects and incentives and 
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restrictions which are not fully reflected in trading goods. The occurrence of 
these technological externalities differs very much between sectors. 
The direction and rate of technical change in a market economy is differ-
ent in every sector and dependent on (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete 1990): 
the sources and nature of technological opportunities; 
the nature of actual or potential markets; 
the possibilities for successful innovators to appropriate a sufficient pro-
portion of the benefits of their innovative activities to justify the research 
effort invested in such activities. 
Because sectors differ in these characteristics, their contribution to the 
national innovation capacity is very different. 
A very important implication of the analysis so far is that there exist un-
equivocal a-symmetrical differences between firms and countries in technologi-
cal capability. There are absolute cost differences between firms and countries. 
These theories are therefore against all kinds of theories which assume identi-
cal production technologies between countries. 
Trade mechanism 
Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) developed a trade model in which the prin-
cipal part is played by absolute technological advantages (technology gaps) 
between countries. These absolute advantages/disadvantages determine the 
competitiveness and world market position of 'all' sectors and have therefore 
a great influence on the income and employment position of a country. The 
minor part is played by relative technological gaps between sectors within a 
country. These relative technological gaps determine the specialization pattern 
between sectors according the mechanism of comparative advantage. 
We can illustrate this model with a simple example: absolute advantages 
determine why a country has an average market share of 0.5% or 10%. Com-
parative advantage determines why one sector in the country with an average 
market share of 10% (0.5%) has a market share of 9% (0.4%) and another sec-
tor has a market share of 11 % (0.6%). 
Dominant technologies, which influence the production in almost all sec-
tors and display often huge positive externalities, are therefore extremely im-
portant in their contribution to the absolute competitiveness of a country 
(MacDonald and Markusen, 1985). 
Implications 
1. A nation's future growth and technological development is affected by 
the current composition of its industries and activities, and by its para-
digms of how to develop and exploit technology (Patel and Pavitt, 1990). 
2. A specialization pattern according to the traditional mechanism of com-
parative advantage can lead a country to specialize in those industries 
(sectors) and activities in which the opportunities for growth and techno-
logical development are least. The current specialization pattern of a 
country has therefore a dynamic effect because this determines in which 
sectors technical skills will be accumulated, innovations will be done, 
72 
economies of scale wil l be realized, etcetera. Sectors differ in these op-
portunities such that the present specialization pattern is extremely im-
portant for the economic performance of countries in the future. A spe-
cialization pattern which is static (Ricardian) efficient can therefore be 
dynamic inefficient. 
3. The possibility of this trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is 
greater the greater the distance from a country to the technological 
leader (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990). 
4. Static economies of plant size are not so important anymore through the 
continuously arising of new technologies. The scale economies which are 
of greatest significance now are of two sorts (Freeman, Sharp and Walker 
1991): 
- economies of scale and economies of scope in research, design, produc-
tion and world-wide marketing networks. The costs of designing, de-
veloping and testing new generations of products and services are of-
ten such that commercial viability is only possible if they are spread 
over very large markets; 
- dynamic economies of scale, which are associated with the accumula-
t ion of knowledge within a firm from R&D, design, production and 
marketing (Pavitt, 1984). 
5. Competition between firms is a very important factor in the innovation 
process. Strong competition forces firms to innovate. The strength of a 
sector can therefore be reflected in the presence of a relatively large 
number of nationally based large firms. Relatively technological strengths 
of countries are therefore correlated with rivalry among the large firms 
and not wi th gigantism (Patel and Pavitt, 1990). 
Policy 
Industrial and trade policy is beneficial if: 
- there is a tradeoff between static Ricardian efficiency and dynamic 
Schumpeterian efficiency; 
- a sector has a high contribution to the absolute competitiveness of a 
country (is it a dominant sector) because it generates for example huge 
externalities; 
- a sector has a high dynamic potential in terms of growth and techno-
logical opportunities. 
Empirics 
Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) find the following empirical relations which 
supported their technology trade model: 
- a variety of science and technology measures (e.g. R&D, Patents) gives 
a constant picture of the aggregate distribution of innovative activities 
between countries; 
- international differences in innovative activities are reflected in differ-
ences in shares of world exports in most sectors, and in manufacturing 
as a whole; 
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- export performance is positively associated with differences in per ca-
pita innovative products and differences in labour productivity; 
- changes in trade performance are more strongly associated with chan-
ges in innovative activities than in relative labour costs; 
- international differences in per capita income have been closely related 
to international differences in per capita innovative activity; 
- international differences in the rate of growth of per capita income 
have been associated with similar differences in the rate of investment 
and in the rate of growth of innovative activities. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Evaluation of empirical tests of theories explaining international 
trade 
Testing trade theories has proven to be extremely difficult. Some of these 
problems in testing theories have been attached upon already. First, the theory 
should be interpreted correctly in the empirical tests. However, theories are in 
most cases formulated in so stylized terms that a translation of a theoretical 
model into an empirical application is very hard to do. Second, it may be diff i-
cult to f ind testable alternative hypotheses from the theoretical model. Third, 
it is often difficult to f ind any variable that closely measures the hypothetical 
construct stipulated by the theory (for instance, what are the 'relative autarky 
prices', how to measure 'imperfect competition', what is a good proxy for 'tech-
nological development', etc.). All in all, the problem in testing a theory is to 
f ind out what needs to be tested and to f ind data that develops a proper corre-
spondence between the theory and observable events. Despite all the efforts 
done sofar there is much controversy on how well tests have been done and 
what these tests suggest about the validity of the model they were based on. 
More often than not empirical work is criticized for being misdirected or in-
complete as tests of international trade models. 
According to Learner (1994) the effects of empirical testing of interna-
tional trade theories on the way economist think about the determinants of 
international trade have been small. That is not surprising to him because as 
'by definition a model is not literally true, so there is no reason to test it' 
(1994:66). Learner, therefore, recommends researchers to 'estimate, not test', 
expressing that data analysis should not take theoretical foundation too liter-
ally. Learner states that an influential empirical study will have to have a proper 
balance of issues, theory and data. The central issue in international economics 
which needs to be addressed is how, if at all, governments should intervene in 
international commerce. Attention seems too much focussed on formulating 
theories while the issues to be addressed are lost in the theoretical discussions 
and questions on mapping the theory into observable phenomena are ignored. 
The latter is also recognized by Krugman who finds that especially with respect 
to the so-called new trade theories '...the sophistication of our models in gen-
eral seems to have outrun our ability to match them up with data or evidence' 
(Krugman, 1990:261). 
The problems concerning the possibilities of empirical validation of trade 
models elicit Learner's statement that 'to make progress, economists ought to 
abandon the idea that models are either true or false in favour of the notion 
that models are sometimes useful and sometimes misleading' (Learner, 1993: 
439). Models are only tools, nothing more and nothing less. Learner stresses 
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that each of the theoretical trade models is appropriate in some circumstances 
and inappropriate in others, and therefore, empirical studies should not try to 
test the validity of the theories. Instead, he claims, empirical work 'might iden-
ti fy the circumstances under which each of the tools is most appropriate, or 
measure the 'amount' of trade that is due to each of the sources. Neither of 
these tasks have been accomplished or often even attempted' (Learner 1994: 
69). In our later work when we focus on the explanation of agricultural trade 
patterns, we will try to identify the circumstances under which each of the (the-
oretical) explanations of trade is appropriate for agricultural products. 
The circumstances meant in the former sentence are much related to 
what has been identified as the main mechanisms of the trade theories. The 
main mechanisms in the trade theories to explain international trade flows are 
factor proportions, economies of scale and differences in technology (technol-
ogy gaps). Each of these three explanations of trade is related to specific key 
commodity characteristics and national attributes (see e.g. Hufbauer, 1970 and 
Choudhri, 1979). For instance, the factor-proportions theory focuses on capital 
intensity of a commodity and the relative endowment of capital and labour of 
a country, while economies of scale is related to the relative importance of 
economies of scale in the production and the size of the country. Technology 
theories are related to technical complexities of products (R&D intensity), and 
a country's income per capita. Our further research will focus on the question 
which of the three major explanations of trade is usable in explaining agricul-
tural trade through identifying the key commodity characteristics in agriculture 
and the related national attributes. This will give us the building stones for a 
design of a concept explaining world trade patterns in agricultural commodi-
ties. A next stage of our research in this field will try to estimate (not test!) our 
concept, for instance by focussing on the bilateral agricultural trade between 
the European Union and Central and East European Countries (CEECs). 
5.2 Government policy and international trade 
The traditional trade theories explain trade by differences between coun-
tries. Exploiting these differences increases national and world welfare. Trade 
policies create 'barriers' to exploit these differences and are therefore welfare 
reducing. No intervention in international commerce is the best policy unless 
countries can improve their terms of trade (only large countries), there exist 
domestic distortions or for political reasons (income-distribution). A country can 
only improve its terms of trade at the expense of other countries and it risks 
therefore retaliation that makes everyone worse off. With respect to domestic 
distortions and income-distributional effects of trade, trade policy is only a 
second best policy. Industrial policy that adjusts directly the distortion or in-
come policy that achieves the desired income-distribution is the first best policy. 
Considering these arguments the traditional theories became strong supporters 
of free trade. 
The modern trade theories based on economies of scale and imperfect 
competition extend the traditional arguments for trade policy and add some 
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new arguments such as the strategic trade argument. The range of possibilities 
to improve the terms of trade is increased because this is possible in the case 
of foreign market power and even small countries can improve their terms of 
trade. Market distortions are inherent in imperfect competition so, for exam-
ple, the wedge between price and marginal costs creates an opportunity for 
government action. However, in the former situation retaliation stays a prob-
lem and in the latter case trade policy is, again, only a second-best policy. So 
the extensions of the old arguments do not provide convincing arguments 
against free trade. What about the new arguments? 
The main new argument is the strategic trade argument. Unlike in the 
survey we now take a broad definition of this argument. Strategic trade policy 
is aimed at keeping some industries that are desirable from a welfare point of 
view with in the country. Industries can be desirable because they generate 
above-normal rents (rent shifting from foreign to domestic firms), they exhibit 
external economies of scale or they generate high externalities. The question 
is whether this argument gives a systematic new reason for trade policy? The 
answer appears to be no because the rent shifting argument is very dependent 
on specific assumptions. A slight change in one of the assumptions changes or 
even reverses the implications of a policy. The benefits related to the external 
economies of scale and the externalities argument are subtle and hard to mea-
sure. In both cases good policy requires that the government has a lot of infor-
mation to choose the right model. However, this information must be so de-
tailed that in most cases it is not available. The empirics also show that the ben-
efits from deviations from free trade are small and that the value of an optimal 
tariff is low (see section 3.1.4). The potential for making policy errors through 
lack of information or the possibility of retaliation by foreign governments 
makes the possible losses greater than the benefits. Therefore, Krugman (1987) 
concludes that free trade is almost never optimal under imperfect competition 
but that it is a good rule of thumb. Feenstra (1995) confirms this conclusion: 
according to his analysis of methods used to estimate the impact of trade poli-
cies under imperfect competition, empirical results lend no support to a strate-
gic role for trade policy. 
The 'new' growth theories built forward on the modern trade theories 
and put these theories in a dynamic context. They deal therefore with the dy-
namic evolution of comparative advantage. Like the technology gap trade the-
ories they stress the role of technological change. Important is that knowledge 
will be generated in current activities. The current specialization pattern deter-
mines therefore the activities in which a country accumulates knowledge or 
exploits economies of scale. Because the technological, scale and growth op-
portunities differ largely between industries the current specialization pattern 
becomes extremely important for a countries' future welfare. The latter cru-
cially depends on the assumptions whether knowledge spillovers are national 
or international in scale. When knowledge spillovers are international in scope 
the specialization pattern does not influence welfare. However, when knowl-
edge spillovers are national in scope or when there exist important dynamic 
external economies of scale the welfare level in the future is dependent on the 
current specialization pattern. 
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The 'new' growth theories that built forward on the neoclassical tradition 
assume most of the time free knowledge spillovers and therefore trade policies 
will not be beneficial. However, the evolutionary theory assumes that a crucial 
part of the generated knowledge is cumulative, specific and path dependent 
and spillovers are therefore local or national in scope. In this case trade policy 
may become beneficial because the gains at stake can be very large in some 
circumstances. Government policy still requires a lot of information about many 
difficult to measure economic variables such as technological opportunities, 
knowledge spillover and external economies of scales. However, government 
policy is more worthwhile than in the case of the modern trade theories be-
cause the gains at stake are larger. 
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